社保基金持股、市场竞争与企业研发投入  

Social Security Fund Shareholding, Market Competition and Enterprise R&D Inputs

作　　者：朱德胜[1] 李金怡 朱磊[1] ZHU Desheng;LI Jinyi;ZHU Lei(School of Accounting,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China)

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2022年第4期104-112,共9页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“国有混合所有制改革中公司治理对企业创新的多维影响机制及效应研究”(20BGL073)。

摘　　要：基于2010-2020年中国沪深A股上市公司研发投入数据,研究社保基金持股对企业研发投入的影响及市场竞争的调节作用。研究发现,社保基金持股能够促使企业提升研发投入水平;通过进一步研究市场竞争对两者关系的调节作用,发现当市场竞争越激烈时,社保基金持股对企业研发投入的促进作用越明显;通过区分异质机构投资者的不同作用,发现社保基金持股比券商持股对企业研发投入的影响更强。Taking China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as a sample, this paper empirically studies the impact of social security fund shareholdings on R&D and the moderating effect of market competition. It is found that the social security fund shareholding can improve the R&D. By further researching the moderating effect of market competition on their relation, this paper finds that the more intense market competition is, the more obvious promotion effect of social security fund shareholding on R&D is. Distinguishing the different effect of heterogeneous institutional investors, social security fund shareholding plays a stronger role in promoting R&D than securities traders shareholding.

关 键 词：社保基金持股 市场竞争 企业研发投入 异质机构投资者 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]