研发投资中的媒体角色:基于央企EVA考核的研究  

The effect of media coverage on innovation investment:An empirical study based on the EVA appraisals of central government-owned enterprises

作　　者：杨洁 邓芬逸 詹文杰[3] Yang Jie;Deng Fenyi;Zhan Wenjie(China University of Geosciences,Wuhan 430074,Hubei,China;Wuhan Textile University,Wuhan 430200,Hubei,China;Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,Hubei,China)

机构地区：[1]中国地质大学(武汉),湖北武汉430074 [2]武汉纺织大学,湖北武汉430200 [3]华中科技大学,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《科研管理》2022年第6期170-177,共8页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目:“中央产业政策不确定性、地方政府干预与企业投资行为:基于国家五年规划变更的研究”(71640020,2017.01—2018.12);国家自然科学基金项目:“业绩考核制度与企业创新:基于央企高管业绩考核制度修订的理论与实证研究”(71672134,2017.01—2020.12);国家自然科学基金项目:“高管个人事项申报、政治风险与国有企业创新投资研究”(71872137,2019.01—2022.12)。

摘　　要：新闻媒体报道对管理层代理行为的影响存在压力效应和声誉效应两种机制。然而,现有关于媒体报道与研发投资关系的研究表明,媒体报道主要通过压力效应减少研发投资。本文基于2010年实施的《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》,以该办法由考核净资产收益率改为考核经济增加值(Economic Value Added,EVA)为自然实验,采用差分法进行检验,发现与不受EVA考核的非央企相比,央企实行的EVA考核降低了经理人的短期业绩压力,经理人开始注重媒体报道的声誉效应,导致媒体报道与研发投资的关系由考核前的显著负相关变为考核后的显著正相关;进一步的研究发现,央企EVA考核带来的媒体声誉效应在市场化程度更高的地区更明显。本文的结果不仅有助于理解媒体作为外部机制发挥公司治理效应的条件,也有助于从媒体治理的视角剖析高管激励发挥作用的传导途径。Due to high risks and long period of innovation project,manager is reluctant on R&D expenditures,which may lead to the problem of management myopia.Literatures propose that there are two opposite effects of media report on management myopia.These two effects are reputation effect and pressure effect respectively.Although media report can regulate management myopia through the channel of reputation effect,empirical evidences indicate that market pressure caused by media results in the decrease of innovation investment.Compared to inside governance mechanism such as proper right and contract,media report,as well as law and financial market,is treated as outside governance mechanism.Under the background of transition economy,with the incomplete inside governance mechanism,researches indicate that outside governance mechanism plays an important role on agency problems.Compared with other outside governance mechanism,media report is more convenient for application.Thus,it is meaningful to investigate how media coverage can improve R&D expenses through the channel of reputation effect.We adopt the new performance appraisals(Economic Value Added,short for"EVA")of top management in"The Revision of Interim Measures for Business Performance Appraisals of Persons-in-Charge at Central Government-Owned Enterprises(CGOE)"in 2009 as a natural experiment to test the relationship between media coverage and R&D expenditures.With this experiment,we test the assumption that whether new EVA performance appraisal adopted in CGOE lessens short-term performance pressure of top management and increases the concerns of management on reputation,thus leads to the replacement of pressure effect by reputation effect on the relationship of media coverage and innovation investment.The reform of performance appraisal is proposed by central government and out of control of corporate,which provides a good setting of exogenous experiment to test the assumption.The new appraisal is applied on CGOEs,which means that non-CGOEs can be treated as contro

关 键 词：媒体报道 研发投资 声誉效应 压力效应 EVA考核 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]