祸福相依:机构投资者调研对企业创新的双刃剑效应  

Blessings and misfortunes are next-door neighbors:the“double-edged sword”effects of institutional investors′site visits on firm innovation

作　　者：彭秋萍 钟熙 周怀康 PENG Qiuping;ZHONG Xi;ZHOU Huaikang(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China;School of Management,Guangdong University of Technology,Guangzhou 510520,China)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640 [2]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2022年第4期108-117,共10页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71832003、71772067、72002075)。

摘　　要：机构投资者调研行为将促进还是损害企业创新?基于“过犹不及”效应和委托代理理论,本研究推测机构投资者调研对企业创新是一把“双刃剑”,低于一定阈值的机构投资者调研行为会促进企业创新,但高于一定阈值的机构投资者调研行为反而会抑制企业创新,且上述作用过程将受制于CEO决策视野。基于2007—2016年中国A股上市公司数据所得到的实证结果支持了上述推测。具体地:第一,随着机构投资者调研次数的增加,企业创新将呈现出先增加而后降低的倒U形关系。第二,机构投资者调研与企业创新之间倒U形关系将因CEO决策视野长短不同而异。随着CEO决策视野的延长(任期较短或持股较多时),机构投资者调研对企业创新的促进效应将随之增强,对企业创新的抑制效应将随之减弱。本研究揭示了机构投资者调研与企业创新之间复杂的非线性关系及其边界条件,对更好地促进企业创新也有重要启示意义。For a long time,enterprises have faced a dilemma in the process of innovation.On the one hand,innovation has been regarded as one of the critical factors of corporate value,performance,and survival.On the other hand,innovation has the characteristics of high risk and uncertainty.Therefore,how to promote firm innovation has been the focus of scholars,entrepreneurs,and policymakers.Any enterprise is embedded in the external environment,and innovation activities will inevitably be subject to the external environment.Based on this logic,previous literature has discussed the influence of external factors(such as government support,laws and regulations,tax policies,analysts′forecast,and academic cooperation,as well as institutional investors)on firm innovation.However,current studies have focused on the heterogeneous effects of institutional investors(i.e.,the shareholding ratio of institutional investors)and failed to explore the impact of institutional investors′site visits on firm innovation.Furthermore,the agency problem has been a core issue that cannot be ignored in the process of future-oriented strategic decision-making and implementation.The CEO plays a vital role in the business decision-making of a company.In the Chinese market,where CEOs have high authority and power distance,companies can be just a reflection of the CEO.The formulation and implementation of firm innovation decisions require the promotion and support of the CEO.Therefore,the impact of institutional investors′site visits on firm innovation may be restricted by the CEO′s agency problem.Numerous studies have suggested that the CEO′s decision-making vision is a key source of agency problems between the CEO and shareholders.Consequently,this research explores the role of the CEO′s decision-making vision in moderating the relationship between institutional investors′site visits and firm innovation to clarify the contextual boundary of institutional investors′site visits affecting firm innovation.This research uses a fixed-effects

关 键 词：机构投资者调研 企业创新 CEO任期 CEO持股 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]