双渠道供应链两阶段信息甄别策略  

Two-stage screening strategies in a dual-channel supply chain

作　　者：赵瑞娟 周建亨[2] ZHAO Ruijuan;ZHOU Jianheng(School of Economics and Management,Shanghai University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 201701,China;Glorious Sun School of Business&Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)

机构地区：[1]上海政法学院经济管理学院,上海201701 [2]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2022年第4期152-163,共12页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872036);国家自然科学基金重点项目子项目(71832001);教育部人文社科项目(18YJA630153);中央高校基本科研业务专项资金项目(2232018H-07)。

摘　　要：本文研究了当制造商委托一个同时经营线上、线下渠道的零售商在两周期内进行产品销售,且市场需求信息为零售商的私有信息时,制造商的信息甄别策略。本文对比分析了完全承诺合约和防重新谈判合约下制造商和零售商博弈决策以及信息激励效果。研究发现,当零售商连续两期披露市场类型为低时,制造商会提供给零售商一个比第一期更高的定价。当第二期市场类型为低(高)时,披露过高类型市场信号的零售商可以获得比披露过低类型市场信号的零售商更高的限价(信息租金/利润)。在一定条件下,完全承诺合约与防重新谈判合约不分离。当两个合约分离且前期信号为低时,第二期高类型零售商可以在防重新谈判合约下获得更高的信息租金,当前期信号为高时,第二期高类型零售商在两种合约下获得的信息租金相同,第一期高类型零售商在防重新谈判合约下也可以获得更高的信息租金。一定条件下,防重新谈判合约可以减少实体店售价向下扭曲的程度,即与完全承诺合约对比,防重新谈判合约对制造商更优。To better cater to the growing needs of the rapidly evolving market,and to improve the shoppers′experience,an increasing number of retailers,including Suning and Jingdong,are adopting the combination of online and offline sales through incorporating online stores to their traditional brick-and-mortar locations or adding physical stores to their online channels.Retailers can get in touch with customers more effectively and garner abundant first-hand sales data when running dual channels,helping them gain better knowledge and comprehension of market demand.Meanwhile,manufacturers can establish the market faster and more smoothly by delegating products distribution to dual-channel operators.However,manufacturers cannot obtain accurate market demand in this scenario.In supply chain practice,the information between retailers and manufacturers is asymmetric;retailers may conceal information to serve their purposes,thereby harming the manufacturers′profit margins.To address this,manufacturers need to design rational incentive mechanisms to achieve screening.Moreover,the information between manufacturers and retailers may be different due to the extension of the cooperation period.Henceforth,the incentive mechanisms need to change accordingly.When the cooperation period is extended,manufacturers can obtain more information about retailers and the market in light of their previous strategies.Given this situation,manufacturers may have an incentive to amend contracts through renegotiation,as opposed to cooperating under previous full-commitment contracts.However,renegotiation may entail costs.Thus,an anti-renegotiation contract is an alternative for screening besides the full-commitment contract.Therefore,it is necessary to investigate the two-stage screening strategies in a dual-channel supply chain,and it is also vital to identify the contract yielding a better incentive effect.A two-stage screening model of a dual-channel supply chain was built,in which a manufacturer(he)distributes his products to a retailer(she)wh

关 键 词：信息甄别 两周期 体验性服务 信息非对称 双渠道供应链 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]