主导型首席执行官促进还是阻碍了企业创新投入?  

Does the Dominant CEO Promote or Hinder Corporate Innovation Investment?

作　　者：张慧[1] 黄群慧[2,3] ZHANG Hui;HUANG Qunhui(University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 102488;Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100836)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院大学商学院,北京102488 [2]中国社会科学院经济研究所,北京100836 [3]中国社会科学院大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2022年第7期59-78,共20页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“现代化经济体系的系统结构、指标测度与重大问题研究”(20ZDA043)。

摘　　要：本文基于管家理论和代理理论,从授权激励视角出发,利用2012—2018年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证考察主导型首席执行官(CEO)与企业创新投入之间的关系。研究结果发现,主导型CEO与企业创新投入之间呈倒U型关系,且这种倒U型关系在国有企业中更为显著;进一步的异质性分析发现,主导型CEO会因企业规模、所在行业的竞争程度的不同,对企业的创新投入产生不同的影响。研究结论对合理授予CEO主导权、挖掘企业创新影响因素以及政府根据企业实际情况制定合理的政策有一定的参考价值。Based on the stewardship theory and the agency theory,from the perspective of authorization incentives,this paper empirically investigates the relationship between dominant chief executive officers(CEOs)and corporate innovation investment,using A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2018 as research samples.The findings reveal that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between dominant CEOs and corporate innovation investment,which is more significant in state-owned enterprises.Further,the heterogeneity analysis indicates that dominant CEOs can have different effects on corporate innovation investment depending on the size of the company and the degree of competition in the industry.The research conclusions may have a certain reference value not only for enterprises to rationally grant CEO dominance and explore the influencing factors of corporate innovation,but also for the government to formulate reasonable reform policies according to the actual situation of enterprises.

关 键 词：主导型CEO CEO主导权 创新投入 授权激励 产权性质 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] F406