社会监督力度与捐赠管理模式——基于上市公司对外捐赠的理论与实证  

Public Oversight and Donation Management Model:Theory and Evidence from External Donation of Chinese Publicly Listed Companies

作　　者：顾振华 高翔 王展 GU Zhenhua;GAO Xiang;WANG Zhan(College of Business and Economics,Shanghai University of Business,Shanghai 200235,China;Faculty of professional Finance&Accountancy,Shanghai University of Business,Shanghai 200235,China)

机构地区：[1]上海商学院商务经济学院,上海200235 [2]上海商学院财务金融学院,上海200235

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2022年第4期76-89,共14页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71501117)。

摘　　要：为了探究社会监督力度加大能否促使企业从直接捐赠转向慈善机构托管,首先在跨期非合作博弈分析框架下,从预期收益和监督成本两个角度阐释了捐赠管理模式的选择逻辑;随后利用2006—2018年中国上市公司数据开展了实证检验。结果表明:第三方机构的存在会影响企业的捐赠意愿,公众对企业关注度增强时,相关第三方的运作会更透明,捐赠方将倾向于信任慈善基金的管理能力;当上市公司面对较为严格的社会监督时,它们会选择慈善组织代为完成对外捐赠行动;上市公司的治理水平和监督效率发挥了媒介作用。This paper investigates whether a greater intensity of public oversight can induce firms to trust charitable foundations in managing their donations.Under a three-stage analytical framework of the non-cooperative game with oversight costs,we first construct a form model for evaluating the tradeoff between outsourcing donation management to third-party charitable foundations and making donations directly to donees.Then,we utilize data on Chinese publicly listed companies from 2006—2018 to test our theoretical prediction that the presence of third-party organizations does affect the willingness of companies to donate and donors will choose charities to operate their donation given strong public monitoring.The empirical findings are twofold.First,firms tend to donate via charities if there exist more media exposure and wider analyst coverage targeted on them.Second,this intention becomes more prominent for non-state-owned enterprises,publicly listed companies headquartered in East China and those belonging to the agricultural and manufacturing industries.

关 键 词：对外捐赠 捐赠管理模式 社会监督 Heckman两步法 社会责任 监管成本 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]