差异化产品逆向供应链上对生产者责任延伸的混合激励  

Mixed Incentive for Extended Producer Responsibility in Reverse Supply Chain of Differentiated Products

作　　者：孙冬石[1] 王文娣 SUN Dongshi;WANG Wendi(School of Information&Business Management,Dalian Neusoft Institute of Information,Dalian 116023,China)

机构地区：[1]大连东软信息学院信息与商务管理学院,辽宁大连116023

出　　处：《物流技术》2022年第7期100-104,共5页Logistics Technology

基　　金：辽宁省教育厅人文社科一般项目(SYDR202015)。

摘　　要：生产者责任延伸(EPR)是城市资源高效循环利用的有效途径,但生产者往往只针对高回收价值的产品实施责任延伸。为了提升生产者责任延伸在差异化产品中的实施率,采用了演化博弈的方法,对产品逆向供应链上利益相关者进行三方博弈分析,并设计了多路径混合激励机制。以博弈稳定解为决策变量,选取不同回收价值产品的相关参数为外生变量,建立系统动力学模型,验证了混合激励机制的实施效果。Extended producer responsibility(EPR)is an effective way to efficiently recycle urban resources,but in practice producers usually only implement it for products with high recycling value.In order to improve the implementation rate of extended producer responsibility in relation to differentiated products,we used the method of evolutionary game to analyze the three-party game of the stakeholders on a reverse supply chain of differentiated products,and designed a multi-path mixed incentive mechanism.Next,with the stable game solution as the decision variable,we selected the relevant parameters of products of different recycling value as the exogenous variable and established a system dynamics model to verify the implementation effect of the mixed incentive mechanism.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 生产者责任延伸 差异化产品 系统动力学 演化博弈 混合激励 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]