风险规避下基于微分博弈的双渠道绿色供应链协调研究  

Research on Coordination of Dual-channel Green Supply Chain Based on DifferentialGame under Risk Aversion

作　　者：沈静静 SHEN Jing-jing(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2022年第7期62-67,共6页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：江苏大学科研立项社会科学论文类项目(20C464)。

摘　　要：双渠道绿色产品供应链下,建立成员均风险规避下的集中与分散决策动态模型,通过成本共担契约对模型进行动态协调,利用数值分析验证,得出结论:产品绿色水平、绿色创新投入、批发价格、零售商、制造商销售价格与消费者绿色偏好正相关;集中决策下各参数与制造商、零售商风险规避系数负相关,分散决策下各参数与制造商风险规避系数正相关,与零售商风险规避系数负相关;成本共担契约下供应链成员及供应链总效用均最高,表明该契约可有效协调供应链。Under the dual-channel green product supply chain,this paper establishes a dynamic model of centralized and decentralized decision-making under the risk aversion of all members,coordinates the model through a cost-sharing contract dynamically,and draws conclusions:product green level,green innovation input,wholesale price,retailer and manufacturer s sales price are positively correlated with consumers green preferences;under centralized decision-making,each parameter is negatively correlated with the coefficients of manufacturer s and retailer s risk aversion while under decentralized decision-making,each parameter is positively correlated with the manufacture s risk aversion coefficient and is negatively correlated with the retailer s risk aversion coefficient;the total utility of the supply chain members and the supply chain is the highest under cost-sharing contract,indicating that the contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain.

关 键 词：风险规避 双渠道绿色供应链 成本共担契约 微分博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]