考试诚信现象的不完全信息博弈分析  

Dynamic Game Analysis of Incomplete Information of Examination Integrity

作　　者：马驰 陈生钻 朱慧 MA Chi;CHEN Shengzuan;ZHU Hui(Zhejiang Sci-Tech University,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学教务处,杭州310018

出　　处：《中国考试》2022年第8期71-76,共6页journal of China Examinations

摘　　要：考试诚信建设是考试工作顺利开展的基础。将博弈论引入考试诚信现象分析,研究考生与考务人员之间的相互行为决策,建立不完全信息动态博弈模型。结合实例,分析考生考试失信现象及失信行为选择的机理,提出减少考试失信行为的4点建议:加大考试失信行为的成本,加强过程性评价,加强对考生心理抗压能力的培养,完善巡考、监考制度。The construction of integrity is a key for university examinations work.In this article,game theory is introduced into the analysis process of the examination integrity phenomenon and the study of the mutual behaviors between the examinees and examination staff.Based on a dynamic game model of incomplete information,the article analyzes the phenomenon of examinees’dishonesty and the mechanism of their choice of dishonesty behavior with examples and puts forward four suggestions to reduce dishonesty behavior in examinations:1)To increase the cost of the dishonesty behavior in examinations;2)To strengthen the process evaluation;3)To strengthen the training of the candidates’psychological pressure resistance;4)To improve the patrol examination and invigilation system.

关 键 词：考试管理 考试诚信 考试失信 动态博弈模型 诚信档案 

分 类 号：G405[文化科学—教育学原理]