移花接木:“长城系”股权质押的“妙用”  

Graft One Twig on Another:The Magic Effect of Changcheng System’s Share Pledges

作　　者：徐慧[1] 张廷晖 聂新来 方巧玲 孙颖 XU Hui;ZHANG Ting-hui;NIE Xin-lai;FANG Qiao-ling;SUN Ying(School of Accounting,Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,Kunming 650221,China;Yunnan Bureau of China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission,Kunming 650100,China;Yunnan Industrial Investment Holding Group Co.,Kunming 650217,China;School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108,China)

机构地区：[1]云南财经大学会计学院,昆明650221 [2]中国银行保险监督管理委员会云南监管局,昆明650100 [3]云南省工业投资控股集团有限责任公司,昆明650217 [4]福州大学经济与管理学院,福州350108

出　　处：《管理案例研究与评论》2022年第3期318-334,共17页Journal of Management Case Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“经济政策不确定性、高管文化特征与公司并购”(71862036);“监管问询、公司外部治理与股价信息效率”(71902035);“制度环境、财政政策与企业创新”(71762032);国家社会科学基金项目“人工智能背景下上市公司财务舞弊识别及动态预警机制研究”(20BGL086);教育部人文社科项目“政府层级、集团内部资本市场与公司高管薪酬研究”(18YJC630210);云南省基础研究计划项目“灾难冲击、企业集团内部市场与公司成本费用调整效率”(202101AT070219);福建省自然科学基金项目“金融环境变化与企业成本费用动态调整机制研究”(2019J01216)。

摘　　要：中国上市公司大股东频繁进行股权质押,但资金流向不够清晰且难以定性,同时民营系族企业集团普遍存在。据此利用民营“长城系”旗下三家上市公司披露的信息,分析系族控制人股权质押动因、资金流向与经济后果。研究发现:长城集团交叉质押三家上市公司股权来筹集大笔资金。质押所获资金以买业绩实现业绩承诺、关联收购套现、卖壳与违规担保套现等方式,在系族内部进行利益输送。短期内“长城系”发展迅猛,大股东获得巨额财富;但随之迅速“爆雷”,系族公司业绩与股价持续下跌,受到处罚乃至退市。不仅为股权质押视角下的利益输送提供了直接证据,也有助于企业集团财务决策的研究。Major shareholders of Chinese listed companies frequently pledge their shares,but the flow of funds is not clear and difficult to characterize,while private family business groups are common.Accordingly,the information disclosed by the three listed companies under the private business of“Changcheng System”is used to analyze the motives,capital flows and economic consequences of the pledges made by the family controllers.The study finds that the“Changcheng System”has cross-pledged its equity in three listed companies to raise large sums of money.The funds obtained from the pledges are used to buy performances to meet the commitments,to cash in on related acquisitions,to sell shells and to cash in on illegal guarantees,etc.,and to transfer interests within the family groups.In the short term,the“Changcheng System”developed rapidly and the controlling shareholders gained huge wealth;however,it was quickly“undermined”and the performance and share price of the family companies continued to decrease,and they were punished and even delisted.This paper not only provides direct evidence of the interest transfer from the perspective of equity pledges,but also contributes to the study of financial decision making of corporate groups.

关 键 词：股权质押 企业集团 民营系族 利益输送 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]