自我知识是元表征吗?——卡鲁瑟斯的元认知理论辨析  

Self-knowledge as Metarepresentation:Reconsidering Carruthers’s Theory of Metacognition

作　　者：徐竹 XU Zhu(Department of Philosophy,East China Normal University,Shanghai 200241,China)

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系,上海200241

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2022年第6期10-15,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“社会认识论维度的第一人称权威研究”(21BZX049);上海市社科规划项目“知行关系视域下的当代西方自我知识理论研究”(2019BZX006)。

摘　　要：卡鲁瑟斯的元认知理论既不同于传统的认知主义,也与构成主义的自我知识理论相对立。与认知主义不同的是,自我知识不再被当作与外部世界的知识同等的“一阶认知”结果,而是元认知的结果。元认知是第一人称的元表征,依赖于被全局广播的感知信息。与构成主义的对立体现在,基于全局广播的读心系统,自我知识是阐释性的而非透明的知识,尽管读心系统的确会把心智表征为看似有透明性的关系。构成主义对卡鲁瑟斯的批评主要有两点回应:一是要把态度的承诺与倾向两种意义区分开,自我知识透明性的主张仅对前者有效;二是要看到构成性与阐释性的关系并非不相容。如此,构成主义与元认知理论的对话就引向了深入。Carruthers’ theory of metacognition is not only different from traditional cognitivism,but also opposite to constitutivist theory of self-knowledge.Unlike cognitivism,self-knowledge is no longer regarded as the result of “first-order cognition”,paralleled with knowledge of the external world,but as the result of metacognition.Metacognition is a first-person metarepresentation that relies on sensory information being globally broadcast.The antithesis of constitutivism is that,based on the global broadcasting mind-reading system,self-knowledge is interpretive rather than transparent,although the mind-reading system does characterize it as seemingly transparency.There are two main responses to Carruthers’ criticism:first,to distinguish the sense of commitment from disposition,the transparency of self-knowledge is only effective for the former;and second,the notions of constitutive relation and of interpretive relation are not exclusive to each other.This leads the dialectics between constitutivism and metacognition theory to a much deep evolvement.

关 键 词：自我知识 元认知 元表征 构成主义 卡鲁瑟斯 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]