强制性分红政策与企业创新——基于分部经理寻租的视角  

Mandatory Dividend Policy and Enterprise Innovation——Based on the Perspective of Division Manager Rent-seeking

作　　者：童盼[1] 陈笑 Tong Pan;Chen Xiao(School of Business,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048)

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048

出　　处：《管理评论》2022年第5期109-123,共15页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772008)。

摘　　要：强制性分红政策实施后,中央企业母公司会将分红压力传导至下属子公司,但同时也引起分部经理寻租行为。本文以中央企业上市公司为处理组,以特征相似的民营企业上市公司为控制组,运用渐进性双重差分模型从分部经理寻租视角探讨强制性分红政策对中央企业下属子公司创新活动的影响。研究发现,强制性分红政策实施后,子公司经理具有通过增加创新投入减少承担分红压力的动机,且这种动机随着收益上缴比例的增加而提高。业绩考核压力以及给予子公司经理一定的股权激励可以缓解分部经理寻租行为。进一步研究发现,强制性分红政策在增加子公司创新投入的同时,并没有提高企业的创新产出,反而降低了企业的创新效率。本文丰富了强制性分红政策经济后果以及企业集团创新问题的研究。In response to the mandatory dividend policy,central SOE's parent companies tend to transmit their dividend pressure to their subsidiaries and this may cause rent-seeking behavior of division managers.Taking listed central SOEs as the treatment group and comparable listed private companies as the control group,this paper uses gradual DID model to explore the impact of mandatory dividend policy on the innovation activities of subsidiaries from the perspective of rent-seeking division managers.It is found that after the implementation of mandatory dividend policy,division managers have the motivation to alleviate the dividend pressure by increasing innovation input,and this motivation increases with the rise of dividend proportion.The pressure of performance appraisal and certain equity incentive to subsidiary managers can alleviate the rent-seeking behavior of division managers.Further research shows that the mandatory dividend policy does not improve the innovation output of enterprises while increasing innovation input,but reduces the innovation efficiency of enterprises.This paper provides new empirical evidence for economic consequence of mandatory dividend policy and innovation in business group.

关 键 词：强制性分红政策 企业集团 分部经理寻租 企业创新 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F276.5