考虑奖惩的闭环供应链策略分析  

Analysis of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Strategy Considering Reward and Punishment

作　　者：王晶[1] 司凤山[1] 戴道明[1] 孙玉涛[1] WANG Jing;SI Fengshan;DAI Daoming;SUN Yutao(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu 233030,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2022年第3期417-422,共6页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：安徽省高校人文社会科学研究重点项目(SK2021A0252);安徽财经大学科研项目(ACKYC21048,ACKYB22015)。

摘　　要：基于对零售商回收废品的奖惩,提出完全理性下博弈主体的最优策略;探究有限理性下博弈主体达到最优策略所经历的策略调整轨迹,对比分析稳定系统中两种策略的关系。结果表明:调整奖惩标准仅影响零售商利润;提升奖惩力度能够提高废品回收率,对制造商、零售商和消费者都有利;处于稳定状态的系统,博弈主体从不同的初始状态出发经过长期反复的策略调整能够收敛于最优策略。Based on the reward and punishment of retailer recycling waste products, the optimal strategy of the game subject under complete rationality is given. The strategy adjustment track experienced by the game subject to achieve the optimal strategy under bounded rationality is explored, and the relationship between the two strategies in the stable system compared and analyzed. The research shows that the adjustment of reward and punishment standards only affects the profits of retailers;Improving the reward and punishment can improve the waste recovery rate, which is beneficial to manufacturers, retailers and consumers;In a stable system, the game subject can converge to the optimal strategy after long-term repeated strategy adjustment from different initial states.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 最优策略 完全理性 奖惩机制 有限理性 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]