有限理性视角下可追溯食品供应链收益共享契约研究  

Research on Revenue Sharing Contract of Traceability Food Supply Chain from the Perspective of Bounded Rationality

作　　者：林强[1] LIN Qiang(Research Center for Infant Products and Services Supply Chain,Chongqing University of Education,Chongqing 400067,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆第二师范学院婴幼产品与服务供应链研究中心,重庆400067

出　　处：《物流科技》2022年第9期123-128,共6页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：重庆市社会科学规划培育项目(2019PY46)。

摘　　要：针对可追溯食品供应链决策问题,建立由一个食品生产企业和一个食品零售企业组成的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,在有无收益共享契约机制下,研究决策者的有限理性行为特征对可追溯食品供应链决策的影响。结果表明:在有无收益共享契约两种情形下,食品零售企业的公平偏好均对自身有利,对食品生产企业和可追溯食品供应链整体不利。在无收益共享契约下,食品生产企业的利他偏好对自身不利,但对食品零售企业和可追溯食品供应链整体有利;但在收益共享契约下,食品生产企业的利他偏好不影响追溯努力水平和可追溯食品供应链整体利润。收益共享契约下的追溯努力水平、企业利润和可追溯供应链整体利润均大于无收益共享契约情形,但都小于集中决策情形。For the decision-making problem of traceable food supply chain, a Stackelberg master-slave game model consisting of a food manufacturer and a food retailer was established. Under the revenue-sharing contract mechanism, the influence of bounded rational behavior characteristics of decision-makers on traceable food supply chain decision-making was studied. The results show that: in the two cases with or without revenue-sharing contract, the food retailer’s fairness preference is beneficial to itself, but unfavorable to the food manufacturer and the whole traceable food supply chain. Under no revenue-sharing contract, the altruistic preference of food manufacturer is not good for himself, but is good for the food retailer and the whole traceable food supply chain;however, under the revenue-sharing contract, the altruistic preference of food manufacturer does not affect the traceability effort level and the overall profit of the traceable food supply chain. The level of traceability effort, enterprise profit and overall profit of traceable supply chain under revenue-sharing contract are all higher than those under no revenue-sharing contract, but they are all lower than those under centralized decision making.

关 键 词：食品供应链 可追溯 有限理性 利他偏好 公平偏好 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]