非国有股东董事会权力能促进国企创新吗?  

Can the Board Power of Non-state Shareholders Promote SOE Innovation?

作　　者：李姝[1,2] 李丹 Li Shu;Li Dan(Business School,NanKai University,Tianjin 300071,China;China Institute of Corporate Governance,NanKai University,Tianjin 300071,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071

出　　处：《外国经济与管理》2022年第4期65-80,共16页Foreign Economics & Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(20AGL012);南开大学文科发展基金项目(ZB21BZ0213)。

摘　　要：本文以2008—2019年完全竞争性国有上市公司数据,对非国有股东董事会权力如何影响国企创新展开研究,研究发现非国有股东委派董事、超额委派董事对国企创新具有重要促进作用。在更换了自变量与因变量衡量方法,并采用PSM法、工具变量法以及滞后一期自变量控制了可能存在的内生性问题后,上述结论依旧成立。进一步研究发现,非国有股东委派董事主要通过发挥监督治理和信息传递功能以提高国企创新积极性。在此基础上,研究还发现非国有股东委派董事对国企创新的促进作用在法治环境较弱、政府与市场关系较紧密的地区更加显著。上述结果表明,新一轮国企混改不能仅停留于以往股权层面的多元混合,更应注重董事会层面的治理改革,以充分发挥非国有股东的独特优势。本文对新一轮国企深化改革具有一定的政策参考价值,并为董事会结构治理、国企创新行为提供了经验证据。In the context of the mixed ownership reform of SOEs, the phenomenon of appointed directors by non-state shareholders in mixed SOEs has attracted much attention from the public and academia. The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce has repeatedly pointed out that the most important concern of private enterprises in participating in the mixed ownership reform of SOEs is their desire to enjoy a substantive voice in major decisions, and in the context of the SASAC’s further proposal to “enable non-public capital to send directors or supervisors as far as possible”, the focus of academics on the mixed ownership reform of SOEs has gradually shifted from the level of equity structure to the level of board of directors. However, few researches have been conducted to explore the achievement of the goal of SOE innovative hybrid reform from the perspective of the board structure.Based on the data of fully competitive state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2019, this paper studies how the board power of non-state shareholders affects SOE innovation, and finds that appointed directors by non-state shareholders and over-appointed directors have an important role in promoting SOE innovation. The finding holds true after replacing the independent and dependent variable measures and controlling for possible endogeneity issues using the PSM method, the instrumental variable method and lagged one-period independent variables. Further research finds that appointed directors by nonstate shareholders have an important role in promoting SOE innovation by playing a supervisory governance and information transfer function. On this basis, the study also finds that the promotion effect of appointed directors by non-state shareholders on SOE innovation is more significant in an environment with weaker rule of law protection and closer government-market relationship.This paper contributes to the existing literature in three aspects: First, unlike previous studies that mainly explore the relationship between mixed ownership

关 键 词：混合所有制改革 董事会权力 超额委派董事 国企创新 非国有股东 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]