清洁生产补贴、收入分配失衡与碳排放权再分配机制研究  

Cleaner Production Subsidies,Imbalance in Income Distribution and Carbon Emissions Permit Reallocation Mechanism

作　　者：范庆泉[1] 刘净然 王竞达[1] Fan Qingquan;Liu Jingran;Wang Jingda

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学财政税务学院,100070

出　　处：《世界经济》2022年第7期50-72,共23页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71904131);2019年中宣部宣传思想文化青年英才项目;首都经济贸易大学北京市属高校基本科研业务费专项资金的资助。

摘　　要：碳排放权分配机制是推进全国统一碳交易市场建设的制度保障。初始碳配额分配无法解决清洁生产补贴中产生的新的不公平问题。本文构建了符合中国渐进式碳减排特征的理论框架,采用shooting方法计算新古典鞍点路径上的均衡解,研究清洁生产补贴引发的收入分配失衡问题和碳排放权的再分配机制。主要结论为:渐进递增的清洁生产补贴政策实现了鞍点路径上福利最大化的目标,但会导致清洁部门过度投资,由此引发主体间的收入分配失衡问题。进一步研究指出,清洁部门获取的碳排放权数量应高于交易市场中的实际排放量,且随着对清洁部门扶持力度的不断加大,应通过再分配方案持续提高该部门获取的碳排放权份额,这有助于实现各方经济利益的帕累托改进。The carbon emissions permit(CEP)allocation mechanism is an institutional guarantee that serves to promote the construction of a unified trading system of carbon emissions.However,the current allocation of initial carbon quotas cannot address the new inequalities stemming from subsidies for cleaner production.This paper constructs a theoretical framework that describes the characteristics of the progressive decline in China’s carbon intensity,using the shooting method to calculate the equilibrium solution on the neoclassical saddle path and study the imbalance in income distribution caused by cleaner production subsidies.The main conclusion drawn from the study is that incremental subsidies for cleaner production can achieve the policy goal of maximising welfare on the saddle path but lead to“excessive”investment in clean sectors,triggering an imbalance in the inter-industrial income distribution.The study also notes that clean sectors should receive more carbon emissions permit allocations than actual emissions in the trading market.With enhanced support for cleaner production,the CEP reallocation should focus on continuously increasing the CEP share acquired by clean sectors,which is conducive to achieving the goal of Pareto improvement in market entities’benefits.

关 键 词：碳排放权 碳交易市场 清洁生产补贴 再分配机制 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F124.7[经济管理—世界经济]