利他行为对动态供应链服务和定价决策的影响  

Influence of altruistic behaviors upon service and pricing decisions of dynamic supply chain

作　　者：姜吉坤 李宇 王威昊 JIANG Ji-kun;LI Yu;WANG Wei-hao(School of Management Engineering,Qingdao University of Technology,Qingdao 266000,Shandong,China;University Research Center for Smart City Construction and Management(a New Kind of Think Tank),Qingdao 266520,Shandong,China;Business School,Qingdao University,Qingdao 266000,Shandong,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛理工大学管理工程学院,山东青岛266000 [2]智慧城市建设管理研究中心(新型智库),山东青岛266520 [3]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266000

出　　处：《山东大学学报（理学版）》2022年第5期97-110,共14页Journal of Shandong University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72001121,71471094)。

摘　　要：在制造商主导的动态产品服务供应链系统中,考虑零售商和制造商具有利他行为偏好,分别构建零售商利他、制造商利他和双方利他3种模式。利用微分博弈理论,分别得到了3种利他模式下的动态均衡策略及其值函数对不同模式下的策略分别关于市场参数和利他偏好参数进行了分析。研究发现:零售商的利他偏好并非总是利己利他的,零售商应当克制这一偏好。制造商的利他偏好总能激励零售商提供更好的服务且使双方的效用得到增加。制造商利他模式下的服务价格比是最高的,仅次于集中模式下的服务价格比。In the dynamic product supply chain system which dominated by manufacturer, considering that retailers and manufacturers have altruistic behavior preferences, three altruistic models are constructed: retailer altruism, manufacturer altruism and bilateral altruism. Using the differential game theory, the dynamic equilibrium strategies and their value functions of three altruistic modes are obtained. The market parameters and altruistic preference parameters of strategies under different modes are analyzed. The results show that retailer’s altruistic preference is not always beneficial to retailer’s utility and retailer should restrain this preference. The manufacturer’s altruistic preference can always encourage retailers to provide better services and increase the utility of both parties. The service price ratio of the manufacturer’s altruistic mode is the highest which is secondly to the centralized mode.

关 键 词：动态供应链 微分博弈 利他偏好 服务 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]