现象学视域下的黑格尔意向性理论  

Hegel’s Theory of Intentionality from the Perspective of Phenomenology

作　　者：王运豪 WANG Yun-hao(College of Philosophy,Nankai University,Tianjin 300350,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学哲学院,天津300350

出　　处：《内蒙古大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2022年第2期34-41,共8页Journal of Inner Mongolia University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：天津市博士研究生科研创新项目(项目批准号:2020YJSB182)。

摘　　要：一般而言,胡塞尔被认为是意向性理论的集大成者,但笔者认为黑格尔亦表达出对意向性的深刻把握。黑格尔认识到了悬置的意义及一切意识都是针对某物的意识。在某些方面,黑格尔对意向性的把握还更为深刻:他阐明了意向性的内在性,并关注到实践中的意向性。在这两方面,黑格尔凸显了自我认识的重要性。但黑格尔的意向性理论也存在问题,他对人的有限性并未充分关注。Hegel’s thought do expresses a rich understanding of intentionality, although Husserl is usually regarded as the epitome of intentionality theory. Hegel grasps the significance of suspension and reveals that all consciousness is aiming at something. Moreover, Hegel’s understanding of intentionality is more meaningful in some aspects. He clarifies the internality of intentionality and notices the intentionality existing in practice. In these two aspects, Hegel highlights the importance of self-knowledge, even though he does not pay enough attention to the finiteness of human beings.

关 键 词：黑格尔 意向性 观念 

分 类 号：B516[哲学宗教—外国哲学]