非国有战略投资者与非国有大股东控制权水平--来自竞争性地方上市国企的证据  

The Existence of Non-state-owned Strategic Investors and the Control Level of Non-state-owned Major Share-holders:Evidence from Locally Competitive Listed State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：潘克勤 李雨霏 潘潇阳 Pan Keqin;Li Yufei;Pan Xiaoyang(School of Accounting,Henan University of Economics and Law;Eurasia International School,Henan University)

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院 [2]河南大学欧亚国际学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2022年第3期139-148,I0025,I0026,共12页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(19AGL011);河南省高校哲学社会科学创新团队项目(2015-CXTD-09);河南财经政法大学校级科研团队项目资助。

摘　　要：本文以2011-2018年竞争性地方上市国企为研究对象,利用资源依赖理论、信息层级理论,研究非国有战略投资者对非国有股东控制权水平的影响。研究发现,非国有战投提升了非国有董事监事席位比例和非国有董事长或总经理任职几率;前十大股东中非国有股权比例越大,则非国有战投越能提升非国有执行董事席位比例。本文利用政府干预理论,采取宏微观结合的分析发现:在政府放权意愿越强、非国有大股东股权比例越大的情况下,非国有战投进一步提升了非国有董事监事席位比例,尤其提升了非国有执行董事比例;在国企隶属的政府层级越低、非国有大股东股权比例总和越大的情况下,非国有战投对提升非国有股东控制权水平具有越大的帮助作用。本文揭示了竞争性地方国企向非国有大股东分享控制权的基本逻辑和现实状况,对推进混改及改善监管具有一定的政策参考价值。This paper takes the competitive local listed state-owned enterprises from 2011 to 2018 as the research subject,and uses the resource dependence theory and the information hierarchy theory to study the influence of non-state-owned strategic investors on the control level of non-state-owned shareholders.The research results of this paper are as follows.(1)Non-state-owned strategic inves-tors increase the proportion of non-state-owned directors and supervisors and the employment probability of non-state-owned chair-man or general managers.(2)The larger the proportion of non-state-owned shares among the top ten shareholders is,the larger the proportion of non-state-owned directors and supervisors will be increased promoted by the non-state-owned strategic investors.The increase in the proportion of non-state-owned executive director is particularly obvious.(3)These results are stable after endogeneity is controlled by instrumental variable method and two-stage regression.Based on the theory of government intervention and using the combination method of macro and micro analysis,we reach the follow-ing analysis results.(1)Under the circumstance that the government’s willingness to delegate power is stronger and the proportion of non-state-owned major shareholders’equity is larger,then non-state-owned strategic investors further increase the proportion of non-stateowned directors and supervisors,especially that of non-state-owned executive directors.(2)When the level of the government to which state-owned enterprises subordinate is lower and the total proportion of non-state-owned major shareholders is larger,non-stateowned strategic investors can play a greater role in improving the control level of non-state-owned shareholders.Specifically,relative to enterprises belonging to the provincial government,when the state-owned enterprises are affiliated to the government at the county level and below,and if the proportion of non-state-owned large shareholders is the greater in the sum,then the non-state strategic inve

关 键 词：竞争性地方国企 非国有战略投资者 制度环境 政府层级 控制权分享 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]