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作 者:贾俊秀 赵学科 Jia Junxiu;Zhao Xueke(School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi’an 710071,China)
机构地区:[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710071
出 处:《系统工程学报》2022年第3期330-343,共14页Journal of Systems Engineering
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171186);陕西省自然科学基金资助项目(2021JM-145);教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目(16XJA630003);陕西高校人文社会科学青年英才支持计划资助项目(91704160004).
摘 要:为了揭示政府采取不同补贴策略对新能源汽车供应链各主体决策行为的影响,建立以电池生产商为领导者,新能源汽车制造商为跟随者的斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型,研究无政府补贴(n)、电池生产商补贴(b)和新能源汽车制造商补贴(m)三种策略下供应链主体的最优决策问题.n策略下废旧电池回收率与电池批发价格呈负相关.政府采取补贴措施能提高电池续航能力和废旧电池回收率,且不同补贴策略对两者影响程度不同.采取m策略时,电池回收率和汽车制造商利润更高;随着消费者绿色意识及废旧电池单位回收收益增加,b策略下电池续航能力和电池生产商利润高于m策略情形.无论何种策略,废旧电池回收率同时受电池批发价格和电池续航能力的影响,且跟电池续航能力呈正相关,跟电池批发价格呈负相关.数值分析表明,两种补贴策略的社会福利大于无补贴策略.To uncover the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the decision-making of a new energy vehicle supply chain,this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model with the battery manufacturer as the leader and the new energy vehicle manufacturer as the follower.Supply chain optimal decisions under strategies of no government subsidy(n),subsidizing the battery manufacturers(b)and subsidizing the new energy vehicle manufacturer(m)are studied respectively.The study shows that without subsidy,the recycling rate of used batteries is inversely related to the wholesale price.Compared with no subsidy,government subsidy can effectively improve battery endurance and recycling rate,and the effects are different under different subsidy strategies.The battery recycling rate and profit of new energy vehicle manufacturers are higher under strategy m;with the increase of consumers’green awareness and unit recycling income of the battery,battery endurance and battery manufacturers’profits are higher under strategy b.The recycling rate of used batteries is positively correlated with the battery endurance.The numerical analysis shows that the social benefits under the two subsidy strategies are greater than under non-subsidy.
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