风险投资退出与企业创新——基于超额委派董事的调节效应  

Venture Capital Exit and Corporate Innovation--Based on Moderating Effect of the Over-appointment of Directors

作　　者：徐虹 谢莉莉 XU Hong;XIE Li-li

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学商学院/安徽创新驱动发展研究院 [2]安徽工业大学商学院

出　　处：《财务研究》2022年第4期67-80,共14页Finance Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(19AJY006)。

摘　　要：本文利用手工收集的风险投资退出数据,基于我国资本市场存在的实际控制人超额委派董事现象,以2009~2018年在中小板和创业板进行IPO且有风险投资(VC)参与的公司为研究样本,实证检验风险投资退出对企业创新投入的影响以及实际控制人超额委派董事在其中的调节作用。研究发现:风险投资退出对企业创新投入产生负面影响,且退出速度越快,对企业创新投入的负面影响越大;实际控制人超额委派董事有助于缓解风险投资退出对创新投入的负面影响,且这种缓解作用在探索式创新企业、存在多个大股东企业、公司风险投资机构(CVC)退出以及高声誉风险投资机构退出的企业中更为显著。进一步的机制检验显示,实际控制人超额委派董事通过降低经理管理防御程度,缓解风险投资退出对创新投入的负面影响。本研究不仅从企业创新角度拓展了风险投资对创业企业影响的文献,而且从缓解风险投资退出对企业创新投入负面影响的维度,对实际控制人超额委派董事发挥治理作用提供了经验证据。Using manually collected data on the venture capital exit and its exit characteristics,based on the fact that the over-appointment of directors by listed companies ultimate controllers,the paper use the SME board and GEM IPO companies included venture capital(VC)companies from 2009 to 2018 as the research samples,empirically tests the effect of the venture capital exit and its exit characteristics on firms'innovation investment and the moderating role of the overappointment of directors by ultimate controllers.The study find that the venture capital exit has a negative impact on firms'innovation investment,and the faster the exit speed,the greater the negative impact on firms'innovation investment,the over-appointment of directors by ultimate controllers can help alleviate the negative impact of the venture capital exit and the exit speed on innovation investment,and this alleviation effect is more evident in exploratory innovative firms,exist multiple large shareholders firms,CVC exits and high-reputation VC exits firms.The mechanism test find that the over-appointment of directors by ultimate controllers alleviates the negative impact of venture capital exit and exit speed on innovation investment by reducing manager"management defense.This research not only expands the literature on the negative impact of venture capital exit and its exit characteristics on startups from the perspective of corporate innovation,but also provides empirical evidence in the over-appointment of directors by ultimate controllers in the practice of corporate governance exercising the corporate governance from the dimension of mitigating the negative impact of venture capital exit on corporate innovation investment.

关 键 词：风险投资退出 创新投入 实际控制人 超额委派董事 经理管理防御 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]