高管薪酬粘性与企业创新——基于国有上市公司的实证检验  

Executive compensation stickiness and firm's innovation:an empirical test based on state-owned listed companies

作　　者：王静[1] 朱瑞雪[1] 李长娥[1] Wang Jing;Zhu Ruixue;Li Chang'e

机构地区：[1]山东建筑大学商学院,山东济南250101

出　　处：《东岳论丛》2022年第8期109-122,192,共15页DongYue Tribune

基　　金：2020年山东省重点研发计划(软科学项目)重点项目“R&D投入、高管特征与创新持续性”(项目编号:2020RZB01034)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：作为“创新”主要力量的企业个体,怎样最大程度发挥创新活力已成为国家“创新驱动”战略成功的关键。通过对2017—2020年我国国有上市公司的数据进行实证分析发现:国有上市公司的高管薪酬粘性对企业创新投资和创新产出均具有正向促进作用,并且这种正向影响在高科技和竞争类国有企业中更为显著;内部控制质量正向调节高管薪酬粘性与企业创新投入、创新产出的关系;政府补助在高管薪酬粘性与企业创新投资关系中发挥了负向调节作用。高管薪酬粘性作为一种补偿性制度设计强调奖励或给予轻微的惩罚,对于高层管理者在创新初期失败的惩罚相对宽松,能够有效地激励高管进行创新活动,同时又受到内外部情境因素的不同影响,这为国有企业建立以创新为导向的薪酬制度提供了参考。As the main force of “innovation”,how to maximize the innovation vitality of individual enterprises has becomethe key to the success of the national “ innovation driven” strategy.Empirical analysis based on the data ofstate-owned listed companies in China from 2017 to 2020 finds that the executive compensation stickiness ofstate-owned listed companies has a positive impact on firms’ innovation investment and innovation output.This positive impact is more significant in high-tech and competitive state-owned enterprises.The quality ofinternal control positively moderates the relationship between executive compensation stickiness and firms’ innovation input and output.Government subsidies play a negative moderating role in the relationship betweenexecutive compensation stickiness and firms’ innovation investment. As a compensatory mean, executivecompensation stickiness tends to give more rewards and less punishments,and such punishment for executivefault in the initial stage of innovation is relatively loose,which can effectively motivate executives to persist ininnovation activities.But these effects are also affected by different internal and external factors.The findingsprovide a guide for state-owned enterprises to set up innovation-oriented compensation system.

关 键 词：高管薪酬粘性 企业创新 国企分类治理 内部控制 政府补助 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]