白衣骑士策略下敌意并购竞价与时机研究  

Research on Bidding and Timing of Hostile Mergers under White Knight Strategy

作　　者：章伟果[1] 扈文秀[1] 杜金柱[1] ZHANG Wei-guo;HU Wen-xiu;DU Jin-zhu(School of Business Administration of Xi’an University of Technology,Shaanxi Xi’an 710054)

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2022年第7期189-200,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71603203);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2015M582691);陕西省科技厅软科学计划项目(2021KRM121)。

摘　　要：从目标企业往往引入白衣骑士来抵制敌意并购的实践出发,通过引入终止费协议构建白衣骑士策略下的动态竞争敌意并购模型,重点求解了均衡状态下竞价阶段的最优竞价策略,序贯博弈阶段白衣骑士的最优进入决策、目标企业的最优终止费策略和敌意并购方的初始报价策略,以及时机选择阶段敌意并购方的最优敌意并购时机。研究结果表明:(1)终止费同时降低了敌意并购方和白衣骑士的最优竞价,但并不会改变竞价结果,即并购协同系数最大的并购方获得目标企业所有权。(2)存在一个协同系数的临界值,当敌意并购方的协同系数高于该临界值时,敌意并购方进行抢占式报价,目标企业接受该报价;反之,敌意并购方不进行抢占式报价,目标企业与白衣骑士签订终止费协议,白衣骑士与敌意并购方竞争并购目标企业。(3)白衣骑士策略提高了协同系数临界值和抢占式报价,降低敌意并购方期望并购收益,推迟敌意并购时机,并在随机冲击较小时阻止具有正收益的敌意并购的发生。From the practice that the target company often introduces the white knight to resist the hostile M&A, the dynamic competitive and hostile M&A model is built under the white knight strategy by introducing the termination fee agreement. The critical points of the pater are the solutions in equilibrium for optimal bidding strategies in bidding phase, the optimal entering decisions for the white knight, the optimal termination fee strategy for the target company, and the best initial offering strategy for the hostile acquirer in the sequential entry phase, and the optimal hostile merger timing for the hostile acquirer in the timing choice phase. The research results show that the termination fee reduces both the optimal biddings of the hostile acquirer and the white knight, but does not change the bidding result, that is, the acquirer with the largest synergy coefficient obtains the target enterprise ownership. There is a threshold of the synergy coefficient. When the synergy coefficient of the hostile acquirer is higher than the threshold, the hostile bidder makes a preemptive bid, and the target company accepts the offer;otherwise, the hostile bidder does not make the preemptive bid, the target company signed a termination fee agreement with the white knight, and the white knight competed with the hostile M&A for the target company. The white knight strategy increases the synergy coefficient threshold and preemptive bid, reduces the expected merger value of the hostile acquirer, delays the timing of hostile M&A, and prevents the occurrence of hostile M&A with positive returns when the random impact is small.

关 键 词：动态竞争敌意并购 白衣骑士 终止费协议 并购竞价 并购时机 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]