零售商公平偏好下基于信用支付的供应链协调模型  

Decision Model of Supply Chain Based on Credit Payment Considering Retailer’s Fairness Preference

作　　者：张冲 尤明钏 ZHANG Chong;YOU Mingchuan(School of Management,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210003,China)

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学管理学院,江苏南京210003

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2022年第3期44-53,共10页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目资助(18YJC630235);南京邮电大学校科研基金资助(NY219117)。

摘　　要：首先,构建Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了零售商公平偏好对供应链均衡解的影响。其次,在只有零售商有公平偏好时,为了提高供应商的效用水平,提出一个契约机制,以此来增加市场需求,从而增加双方效用,协调供应链。研究表明:零售商的公平偏好系数越大,供应商提供给零售商的信用支付期越长;零售商的效用随着公平偏好系数的增大而增大,供应商的效用随着偏好系数的增大而减少;供应商为了提高自身的效用水平,在双方谈判能力相同的基础上,延长信用期给零售商,而零售商提供部分收益给供应商,最后双方的效用增加,供应链得到协调。最后通过数值仿真说明了零售商公平偏好对供应链的影响,并验证了契约的有效性。First,by constructing Stackelberg game model,the effect of retailer’s fair preference on supply chain equilibrium solution was studied.Second,considering that only retailers had fair preferences,in order to improve the suppliers’ efficiency,a contract mechanism was proposed to increase market demand,thereby increasing both sides’ utility and coordinating supply chain.The results show that the greater the retailer’s fair preference coefficient is,the longer the credit payment period provided by the supplier,the greater the retailer’s utility;the retailer’s utility increases with the fair preference coefficient,while the supplier’s utility decreases with the preference coefficient.On the basis of the same negotiating ability of both sides,the supplier extends the credit period to retailers in order to improve its own utility level,while the retailer provides a part of the revenue to suppliers.Then,the effectiveness of both sides is increased,and the supply chain is coordinated.Finally,numerical simulation shows the impact of retailer’s fair preference on the supply chain and verifies the validity of the contract.

关 键 词：信用支付 公平偏好 STACKELBERG博弈 契约机制 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]