基于委托代理的工程供应链激励契约分析  

Analysis on the Incentive Contract in Construction Supply Chain Based on the Principle-Agent Theory

作　　者：宋宁 周颖[2] Song Ning;Zhou Ying(Office of Science and Technology,Shijiazhuang Tiedao University,Shijiazhuang 050043,China;School of Management,Shijiazhuang Tiedao University,Shijiazhuang 050043,China)

机构地区：[1]石家庄铁道大学科技处,河北石家庄050043 [2]石家庄铁道大学管理学院,河北石家庄050043

出　　处：《石家庄铁道大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第3期30-35,共6页Journal of Shijiazhuang Tiedao University（Social Science Edition）

基　　金：河北省社会科学基金项目"碳排放权交易市场背景下政企合作减排研究"(HB17GL083);河北省社会科学发展课题"基于消费行为的全渠道供应链库存决策优化研究"(20200302026);2021年度河北省科技厅软科学项目(21557623D)。

摘　　要：契约-激励机制的设计和管理是建筑工程供应链合作伙伴关系的重要保证,对于工程供应链的管理具有重要作用。基于工程供应链的特征,将承包商的努力分为不可观测努力和可观测努力,在此基础上构建委托代理模型,分析业主和承包商间的激励契约机制。通过分析得到:当同时考虑承包商的不可观测的努力和可观测努力时,业主可以通过激励强度引导承包商的不可观测努力,而可观测努力可以通过契约机制来强制执行。因此,对于承包商的不可观测努力和可观测努力,业主可选择激励与契约机制相结合,实现期望收益最大化。The design and management of contract incentive mechanism is an important guarantee for the partnership of construction supply chain,and plays an important role in the management of construction supply chain・Based on the characteristics of the construction supply chain,the contractor's efforts were divided into non-observable and observable,the paper analyzed the incentive contract mechanism between the owners and contractors based on the principle-agent model.By analyzing,the result could be reached that when considering the non-observable effort and observable effort of contractors together,the owner could guide the non-observable effort of contractors through the incentive,and the observable effort could be enforced through contractual mechanisms.Therefore,for the non-observable and the observable efforts of contractor,the owner could choose the combination of incentive and contract mechanism to maximize the expected revenue.

关 键 词：委托代理 激励 契约 工程供应链 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]