新产品开发合作中优先许可权机制研究  

Value of preemptive licensing rights in new product development partnership

作　　者：万光羽[1,3] 曹裕 WAN Guang-yu;CAO Yu(School of Economics and Trade,Hunan University,Changsha 410082,China;School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China;Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,长沙410082 [2]中南大学商学院,长沙410083 [3]中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院,北京100190

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2022年第7期41-60,共20页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71802076;71972182);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(2020JJ2051;2022JJ30176);湖南省科技创新人才计划科技创新领军人才资助项目(2021RC4007)

摘　　要：高科技新产品的成功开发常常依赖于创新链和产业链的多方合作,利用比较优势有效提高开发成功率.而在新产品研发早期建立合作关系时,合作将面临较高的技术和市场价值不确定性,难以达成一个具体的利益分配合约.灵活的优先许可权机制不仅允许双方在早期建立合作关系,而且使双方将利益分配决策延迟到不确定性较低的时机.本文建立序列新产品开发合作的博弈模型来研究优先许可权机制.模型包含一个负责前期技术研发的技术发明者和一个负责后期生产推广的市场者.双方围绕一个仍面临技术和市场价值不确定性的新产品进行开发合作。本文采用合同理论框架讨论优先许可权的作用价值,并考虑技术发明者关于新产品的潜在平均市场价值的信息不对称情形.研究表明:当双方合作可以降低研发成本时,优先许可权可提升技术发明者的研发投入,并提升双方合作的总收益.同时,优先许可权的价值随着新产品的潜在平均价值、市场价值不确定性、以及市场竞争程度的增加而上升.在信息不对称情形下,技术发明者可利用优先许可权建立一个筛选模型,使得高价值类型的市场者获得该产品.本文的研究为理解优先许可权的价值作用提供理论支撑,也为创新合作实践提供参考.The successful development of new products requires multi-party cooperation throughout the innovation chain by using the comparative advantages between companies with technology R&D capabilities and companies with market development experience. When the two parties establish a collaborative relationship in the early stage of new product development, the new products still have high technological uncertainty and market value uncertainty. This makes it difficult for the two parties to form a specific payoff allocation contract. A flexible preemptive licensing right not only enables the early establishment of cooperative relations but also allows both parties to postpone specific payoff allocation decisions to a time with less uncertainty. This paper establishes a sequential game model to study the preemptive licensing right. The model includes an innovator responsible for early technology R&D and a marketer for later production and promotion. The two parties are engaged in partnership on the development of a new product still facing uncertainties in technology and market value. This article uses contract theory to discuss the value of the preemptive licensing right and considers the information asymmetry of the potential average market value of the new product. Results show that when both parties can reduce R&D costs to a certain extent through cooperation, preemptive licensing rights can increase the R&D investment by the innovator, thereby increasing the total payoff of the partnership. Meanwhile, the value of preemptive licensing rights increases with the potential average value of new products, the uncertainty of market value, and the degree of market competition. In the case of information asymmetry, the innovator can use preemptive licensing rights to establish a screening model so that high-value marketers can obtain the licensing right of the product. Our study provides theoretical support for understanding preemptive licensing rights’ value and provides some practical insights for practitioners.

关 键 词：新产品开发合作 优先许可权 合同理论 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]