公平关切信息不对称下双渠道供应链决策与激励合同设计  

The Decision and Incentive Contract Designing of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Based on Information Asymmetry of Fairness Concerns

作　　者：舒斯亮 许琴琴 SHU Siliang;XU Qinqin(School of Business,Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University,Nanchang Jiangxi 330038,China)

机构地区：[1]江西科技师范大学商学院,江西南昌330038

出　　处：《江西师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第4期349-356,共8页Journal of Jiangxi Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71961010);江西省教育厅科学技术研究(GJJ180611)资助项目。

摘　　要：基于实体零售商公平关切行为,分析信息对称与信息不对称下双渠道供应链决策问题,并探讨如何设计激励合同促使实体零售商传递真实的公平关切信息.研究发现:信息不对称下实体零售商传递不真实公平关切信息对双渠道供应链决策会产生影响,且与信息对称情形相比,信息不对称下制造商利润会减少,而实体零售商效用在传递公平关切值高于真实值时会增加;制造商设计的激励合同能促使实体零售商传递真实的公平关切信息,但合同能否达成受实体零售商真实公平关切值、消费者对渠道价格差异敏感性等因素的影响.Based on fairness concerns of the physical retailer,the decision of dual-channel supply chain under the situation of information symmetry and information asymmetry is analyzed,and it is discussed how to design the incentive contract to promote the physical retailer to deliver the real information of fairness concerns.The results show that when the physical retailer gives false information about fairness concerns,the decision of dual-channel supply chain will be affected,and compared with the situation of information symmetry,the manufacturer′s profit will decrease,the utility of the physical retailer will increase when the fairness concerns value transmitted is higher than the real value.The incentive contract designed by the manufacturer can enable the physical retailer to deliver the real information of fairness concerns,however,whether the contract can be reached is affected by the real value of fairness concerns,the sensitivity of consumer to channel price difference,and so on.

关 键 词：公平关切 信息不对称 双渠道供应链 决策 激励合同 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]