控股股东股权质押会影响公司财务舞弊风险吗?  

Will the Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge Affect Companies’ Financial Fraud Risk?

作　　者：张震[1] 胡金月 金永红 Zhang Zhen;Hu Jinyue;Jin Yonghong(School of Finance and Business,Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,China)

机构地区：[1]上海师范大学商学院,上海200234

出　　处：《金融理论探索》2022年第5期50-61,共12页Exploration of Financial Theory

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学规划一般项目“股权质押下控股股东行为及其监管研究”(2020BJB008)。

摘　　要：股权质押是上市公司普遍使用的融资方式,控股股东在股权质押后,为了不丧失控制权会采取一些措施以稳定公司的股价。本文探究了控股股东股权质押与公司财务舞弊风险之间的关系,并进一步探究两职合一的治理机制是否在两者之间起调节作用。研究发现,控股股东股权质押会提高公司的财务舞弊风险,并且在两职合一的情况下,公司的财务舞弊风险更高,即两职合一为控股股东在股权质押之后实施舞弊行为提供了职务便利。Equity pledge is a commonly used financing method for listed companies. After making equity pledge, the controlling shareholder will take some measures to stabilize the company’s stock price to avoid losing control. This paper studies the relationship between the controlling shareholder equity pledge and the risk of corporate financial fraud and further explores whether the governance mechanism of CEO duality will increase the risk. The study finds that controlling shareholder equity pledge will increase the risk of corporate financial fraud, and the risk of corporate financial fraud is higher when the company’s chairman is also CEO, providing convenience for fraud after controlling shareholder equity pledge.

关 键 词：控股股东 股权质押 财务舞弊风险 两职合一 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F275