论黑格尔法哲学中的义务论  

On Deontology in Hegelian Legal Philosophy

作　　者：徐超 Xu Chao

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院

出　　处：《理论界》2022年第8期46-51,共6页Theory Horizon

摘　　要：黑格尔在法哲学中对义务的探讨与一般意义上在个体品行方面的探讨有所不同,从伦理法(Sittenlichkeit)的角度上将国家视为实体/主体,在法哲学的视域中讨论政治义务而非个体义务和德性。个体在尽义务的过程之中,就实现了作为个体和国家的自由,国家作为伦理实体体现了普遍的自由,但个体的德性并不能体现普遍的自由,是作为个体的特殊品质(Virtuositaet),这种特殊品质是个体履行国家预先派定的义务并由此形成了稳定的品质。如果国家制度完善,那么德性就仅需要履行特定的义务;如果国家制度不完善,就需要个体的卓异德性起作用,给伦理实体以合理的建构。Hegel’s discussion of duty in the philosophy of law differs from the general discussion of individual character in the sense that the state is considered as an entity/subject from the perspective of ethical law(sittenlichkeit)and is discussed in the context of the philosophy of law as political duty rather than individual duty and virtue. The state as an ethical entity embodies the universal freedom, but the virtue of the individual does not embody the universal freedom. It is a special quality(virtuositaet) of the individual,which means that individuals fulfill their obligations assigned by the state in advance and thus form a stable quality. If the state system is perfect,then virtue needs to fulfill only specific obligations;if the state system is imperfect, then it needs to work on the exceptional virtues of individuals,who can create abundance and give rational constructions to ethical entities.

关 键 词：黑格尔 义务论 

分 类 号：B1[哲学宗教—世界哲学]