演化博弈下矿工的不安全行为及数值仿真  

Miners′unsafe behaviour and numerical simulation under evolutionary game

作　　者：刘海涛[1] 朱腾 倪东滟 Liu Haitao;Zhu Teng;Ni Dongyan(Heilongjiang Ground Pressure&Gas Control in Deep Mining Key Lab,Heilongjiang University of Science&Technology,Harbin 150022,China)

机构地区：[1]黑龙江科技大学黑龙江省煤矿深部开采地压控制与瓦斯治理重点实验室,哈尔滨150022

出　　处：《黑龙江科技大学学报》2022年第5期610-617,共8页Journal of Heilongjiang University of Science And Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(52074110);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(LH2019E087)。

摘　　要：为有效减少煤矿生产过程中的矿工不安全行为,利用演化博弈理论和数值仿真方法,构建了矿工与监管者的博弈模型并进行求解。结果表明:当监管者选择“严格监管”,双方存在最优组合策略“严格监管,安全行为”,在此策略组合下,博弈双方的安全意愿是互相促进的;做出“安全行为”的成本是影响矿工策略选择的关键因素;适当提高奖励力度和惩罚力度会抑制矿工做出“不安全行为”的选择意愿,存在最优的奖励力度及惩罚力度;奖惩结合相比单一激励的管理方式可以更大程度上减少矿工的不安全行为现象。This paper is an attempt to construct an evolutionary game model between miners and supervisors and to find a solution based on evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation methods for effectively reducing miners′unsafe behaviors in coal production.The results show that"strict regulation"chosen by regulators is the optimal combination of strategies"strict regulation,safe behavior",under which both game sides could reinforce the safety intentions mutually;the key factor influencing miners′choice of strategy is the cost of doing"safe behavior";"unsafe behavior"can be inhibited by increasing the rewards standard and penalties properly;the combination of rewards and penalties is more effective in managing miners′unsafe behavior than a single incentive to a greater extent.

关 键 词：不安全行为 安全监管 演化博弈 数值仿真 

分 类 号：TD77.1[矿业工程—矿井通风与安全]