规范性自由概念——梅洛-庞蒂《知觉现象学》中的非标准版相容论  

The Concept of Normative Freedom Merleau-Ponty’s Non-Standard Compatibilism in the Phénoménologie de la Perception

作　　者：刘哲[1] Liu Zhe(Department of Philosophy,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系,北京100871

出　　处：《北京大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2022年第5期60-71,共12页Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：在近代以来围绕自由问题的论争中,无论标准版相容论还是不相容论都把否定含义的自由概念视为不言自明的理论出发点。自由始终被视为主体内在的固有状态。通过放弃因果概念框架,梅洛-庞蒂尝试发展一种非标准版相容论,把自由理解为规范性成就。他的规范性自由概念奠基在具身化主体的实践自我意识之上。主体要在行动中并通过行动把自我构建为回应世界风格规范性的自由行动者,而自由行动主体要在规范性机制约束中通过与他人相互承认赢得自己的规范性身份并成就规范性自我。由此,世界与他人的限制成为规范性自我的内在构成要素。根据梅洛-庞蒂的非标准版相容论,主体的自由是自我与他人在世界风格规范性约束中通过相互承认共同实现的规范性成就。In the modern debate about the concept of freedom,both standard compatibilism and incompatibilism take it for granted that a negative form of freedom must be presupposed theoretically at the very outset.For both of them,human freedom is regarded as a ready-made innate state of the subject.Merleau-Ponty(梅洛-庞蒂)thoroughly abandoned the conceptual framework of causality as such in order to develop a non-standard form of compatibilism related to the problem of freedom.For him,human freedom can only be understood as a normative achievement.His conception of normative freedom is grounded on a theory of practical self-consciousness of the embodied subject.Such a subject must be self-conscious of selfhood as a free agent who responds to the normative demand from the style of the world.The free subject can only gain a normative identity to realize normative“I”through a mutual recognition of human subjects within the bounds of a normative institution.As such,both the world and others are no more understood as constraints but innermost components in the unique structure of the normative“I”.In this paper,we will finally argue that our freedom amounts to such a normative achievement that human subjects can only make altogether in their mutual recognition within the normative bounds of the world.

关 键 词：主体性 自我意识 自由 规范性 风格 

分 类 号：B565.5[哲学宗教—外国哲学]