问询函监管对资本市场信息甄别的效果——基于盈余价值相关性的研究  

The Effect of Inquiry Letter Supervision on Capital Market Information Screening: Research Based on the Value Relevance of Earnings

作　　者：王琬婷 唐雪松[1] 石翔燕 WANG Wan-ting;TANG Xue-song;SHI Xiang-yan(School of Accounting,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China;School of Accounting,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130 [2]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2022年第10期73-92,共20页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71672152);中央高校基本科研项目(JBK19072018155)。

摘　　要：问询函制度正成为中国资本市场信息监管的重要手段。本文研究了财务报告问询函监管对盈余价值相关性的影响,实证结果表明财务报告问询函显著降低了公司盈余的价值相关性;问询次数越多,盈余价值相关性越低;该结果在考虑内生性问题、变量替换等稳健性检验后仍然成立。异质性分析表明,信息披露质量较差、代理问题较严重的公司中,监管问询对盈余价值相关性的影响更显著,而QFII持股能够弱化问询函的上述影响。进一步分析表明,问询函显著增加了信息鉴证方审计师的收费,减少了信息中介分析师的关注,并且导致信息传播者媒体的负面报道显著增多,验证了问询函作用于投资者的信息效应。The inquiry letter system is becoming an important means of information supervision in China’s capital market. This paper studies the impact of financial report inquiry letter regulation on the value relevance of earnings. The empirical results show that financial report inquiry letter significantly reduces the value relevance of corporate earnings. The more inquiries, the lower the relevance of earnings value. After controlling the endogenous influence, the conclusion is still valid. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the inquiry letter has a more significant effect on the reduction of earnings value relevance in the case of poor quality of information disclosure, serious agency problems and weak investor supervision. Further analysis shows that the inquiry letter significantly increases the fees charged by the auditor of the information assurance party, reduces the attention of information intermediary analysts, and leads to a significant increase in negative reports from the media of information disseminators, which verifies the information effect of the inquiry letter for investors.

关 键 词：问询函 盈余价值相关性 信息披露质量 公司治理水平 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]