动力电池生产商和政府两者演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Battery Manufacturers and The Government

作　　者：温喜梅 郭斌峰 Wen Xi-mei;Guo Bin-feng(Zhengzhou Institute of Industrial Application Technology,School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering,Xinzheng,Henan 451100)

机构地区：[1]郑州工业应用技术学院,河南新郑451100

出　　处：《内燃机与配件》2022年第18期112-114,共3页Internal Combustion Engine & Parts

基　　金：教育部2020产学合作协同育人项目“动力电池及控制技术课程建设”,项目编号:202002250018;2021年度河南省工程技术研究中心“河南省隧道工程机械工程技术研究中心”;2020年度郑州工业应用技术学院校级课程思政建设项目([郑工政]159号)。

摘　　要：随着新能源汽车的大规模推广,动力电池的报废正处于高峰期,为实现绿色环保、提高资源再生利用率,可加强对动力电池的回收利用。基于动力电池生产商和政府之间关系,构建生产商、政府两者演化博弈模型,进而对两者关系长期发展与演化稳定策略进行剖析,对动力电池高效的处理提供合理性建议。With the large-scale promotion of new energy vehicles,the scrapping of power batteries is at the peak period.In order to achieve green environmental protection and improve the utilization rate of resource regeneration,the recycling and utilization of power batteries can be strengthened.Based on the relationship between the power battery manufacturer and the government,an evolutionary game model between the manufacturer and the government is constructed,and then the long-term development and evolutionary stability strategy of the relationship between the two are analyzed,and reasonable suggestions are provided for the efficient treatment of power batteries.

关 键 词：动力电池 有限理性 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]