经济增加值考核是否会引发企业研发操纵行为——基于双重差分模型的实证研究  

Whether Economic Value Added Assessment Trigger Corporate R&D Manipulation or Not——Empirical Research Based on Difference-in-Difference Model

作　　者：郝婷[1] 马研硕 Hao Ting;Ma Yanshuo(School of Economics and Management,Inner Mongolia University of Science and Technology,Baotou 014010,China)

机构地区：[1]内蒙古科技大学经济与管理学院,内蒙古包头014010

出　　处：《中国科技论坛》2022年第10期75-84,共10页Forum on Science and Technology in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“业绩考核与激励、管理者特征对国有企业研发投资的影响研究”(71962028)、“环境信息披露质量、绿色技术创新与企业价值”(72062025);内蒙古自然科学基金“环境信息披露质量、技术创新投入对企业价值的驱动研究”(2020MS07007);包头市科技计划项目“包头市稀土产业创新战略联盟运营绩效影响因素研究”(2019C3003-1-4)。

摘　　要：研发操纵行为对企业未来业绩和价值创造具有不利影响,目前相关研究主要集中于高新企业认定和税收加计扣除政策下是否存在研发操纵。本文以2010年央企全面实施经济增加值考核为自然实验,选取2008—2020年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,构建双重差分模型实证检验EVA考核实施是否引发央企研发操纵行为,进一步探究研发操纵在EVA考核与企业价值关系中的作用机理。研究发现:EVA考核实施会引发部分企业进行研发操纵;EVA考核整体上抑制央企价值提升,部分归因于企业正向研发操纵行为的存在;企业正向研发操纵行为在EVA考核影响企业价值提升过程中发挥中介效应。本文结论拓展了企业研发操纵驱动因素的研究,有助于国资委通过监管研发操纵行为提高EVA考核的激励效果。R&D manipulation has an adverse impact on the future performance and value creation of enterprises.At present,relevant researches mainly focus on whether there is R&D manipulation under the recognition of high-tech enterprises and the tax deduction policies.Taking the event that the central state-owned enterprises comprehensively implemented the economic value added assessment in 2010 as a natural experiment,this paper selects the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2008 to 2020 as the research samples and constructs a difference-in-difference model to empirically test whether the implementation of EVA assessment trigger central enterprises R&D manipulation or not,and further explores the mechanism of R&D manipulation in the relationship between EVA assessment and corporate value.The results show that the implementation of EVA assessment will trigger some enterprises R&D manipulation.EVA assessment will inhibit the promotion of corporate value of central enterprises as a whole,partly due to the existence of the forward R&D manipulation of the company.The forward R&D manipulation of enterprises has played an intermediary effect in the process of EVA assessment affecting the promotion of corporate value.The conclusions of this paper expand the research on the driving factors of enterprise R&D manipulation and help the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council to improve the incentive effect of EVA assessment by supervising R&D manipulation.

关 键 词：经济增加值 考核 研发操纵 企业价值 中介效应 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]