基于绿色供应链视角的企业生态创新扩散演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary Game Research on the Ecological Technology Diffusion of Enterprises from the Perspective of Green Supply Chain

作　　者：杨国忠[1] 周午阳 Yang Guozhong;Zhou Wuyang(School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙少410083

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2022年第17期230-239,共10页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会课题“基于绿色供应链的生态技术扩散机制研究”(XSP21YBZ074);湖南省自然科学基金项目“环境规制对企业生态技术扩散的激励:基于利益相关者行为视角”(2021JJ30885)。

摘　　要：利用演化博弈方法,构建绿色供应链企业生态创新扩散的博弈模型并进行稳定性分析,借助MATLAB仿真分析不同参数对生态创新扩散的影响。研究表明,供应链上处于创新采纳方的企业大都会选择引入生态创新;生产商研发出生态创新更有利于该创新的扩散;专利费和协同效益对生态创新扩散有显著正向作用,而“搭便车”收益对生态创新扩散有一定负向作用;政府对扩散方的奖惩机制是生态创新扩散的“助推器”,同时也应对采纳方辅以必要的监管。A game model of the ecological innovation diffusion of green supply chain enterprises was constructed and its stability based on the evolutionary game method was analyzed.And then,the impact of different parameters on the ecological innovation diffusion was analyzed by matlab software.Research shows that technology adopters in the supply chain will mostly choose to introduce ecological innovation;the ecological innovation developed by manufacturers is more conducive to the diffusion of the innovation;patent fees and co-benefits have a significant positive impact on the diffusion of ecological innovation,while free-rider income has a certain negative effect on the diffusion of ecological innovation;the government’s subsidies and penalties for innovation providers are the boosters of ecological innovation diffusion,and it should also take necessary supervision on the adopters.

关 键 词：绿色供应链 生态创新扩散 演化博弈 仿真 政府规制 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]