管理者过度自信与股价崩盘风险研究——基于A股上市公司的经验分析  

A Research on Managerial Overconfidence and Risk of Stock Price Crashes

作　　者：周蕾[1] 杨佳 韩菁 ZHOU Lei;YANG Jia;HAN Jing(Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu,Anhui,233030,China;Hefei Wanda Plaza Commercial Management Co.,Ltd.,Hefei,Anhui,230071,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233030 [2]安徽财经大学,安徽蚌埠233030 [3]合肥万达广场商业管理有限公司天鹅湖分公司,安徽合肥230071

出　　处：《武汉商学院学报》2022年第4期73-80,共8页Journal of Wuhan Business University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目《会计信息质量、股票风险溢价与股价崩盘预警机制研究》(项目编号:18BGL076)。

摘　　要：以并购商誉“暴雷”及股价频繁崩盘的背景为切入点,对我国2011—2019年A股非金融上市公司的管理者过度自信、并购商誉与股价崩盘风险之间的关系进行了研究。结果显示过度自信的管理者不仅会推升公司巨额并购商誉的可能性,而且会加剧股价崩盘风险的发生,并购商誉在管理者过度自信与股价崩盘风险之间发挥了部分中介作用。因此,建立有效的内外部治理机制,有效约束管理者的非理性并购行为、同时完善资产定价体系,抑制并购商誉泡沫是抑制股价崩盘风险的有效途径。From the perspective of the collapse of Mergers and Acquisitions(M&A) goodwill and frequent stock price crashes, this paper analyzes the relationship among managerial overconfidence, M&A goodwill and risk of stock price crashes in China’s A-share non-financial listed companies from 2011 to 2019.The results show that overconfident managers increased not only the possibility of a company’s huge M&A goodwill, but also the risk of stock price crashes, and that M&A goodwill partially mediated managers’ overconfidence and risk of stock price crashes.Therefore, ways to curb the risk of stock price crashes include establishing an efficient internal and external governance mechanism, restricting managers’ irrational M&A effectively, improving the asset pricing system, and restraining the M&A goodwill bubble.

关 键 词：管理者过度自信 并购商誉 股价崩盘风险 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]