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作 者:梁喜 刘莹 LIANG Xi;LIU Ying(College of Economics&Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)
机构地区:[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074
出 处:《工业工程》2022年第5期29-37,共9页Industrial Engineering Journal
基 金:重庆市教委科学技术研究资助项目(KJ1500521)。
摘 要:考虑由单个主导制造商和单个零售商组成的双渠道供应链,以及政府以社会福利最大化为目的对制造商履行的社会责任进行补贴决策,研究集中式和分散式决策下政府补贴比率和制造商谎报因子对供应链和社会福利的影响。研究发现,分散式决策中的企业社会责任努力水平和最大社会福利总是低于集中式决策;分散式决策中的最优政府补贴比率高于集中式决策;利用成本分担-收益共享的组合契约可以实现双渠道供应链的完美协调与帕累托改进。Considering a dual-channel supply chain composed of a single leading manufacturer and a single retailer,and the government's decision to subsidize the manufacturer's social responsibilities for the purpose of maximizing social welfare,a study is conducted on the impact of government subsidy ratios and manufacturers'misreporting factors on the supply chain and social welfare under centralized and decentralized decision-making.The study finds that the corporate social responsibility effort level and maximum social welfare in decentralized decision-making are always lower than those in centralized decision-making;the optimal government subsidy ratio in decentralized decision-making is higher than that in centralized decision-making;the combination contract of cost sharing and revenue sharing can achieve perfect coordination and Pareto improvement of the dual-channel supply chain.
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