预期国际环境协议的效应分析  

Analysis on effect of anticipated international environmental agreements

作　　者：王荧 Wang Ying(Finance College,Fujian Jiangxia University,Fuzhou 350108,China)

机构地区：[1]福建江夏学院金融学院,福建福州350108

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2022年第5期590-604,共15页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：福建省创新战略研究资助项目(2021R0163);福建省高等学校新世纪优秀人才支持资助项目(闽教科(2018)47号);福建江夏学院国家社科基金资助项目(JXZ2021003).

摘　　要：通过构建两阶段(当前阶段和未来阶段)跨界污染动态博弈模型,分析了预期国际环境协议对各国各期污染排放量以及各期污染存量的影响.研究表明,预期到国际环境协议会生效并且会在第2期实施环境友好政策,则在各国各期污染排放量方面,全部国家第1期污染排放总量随着任意一个国家第2期的初始污染排放权的核配量的减少而增加,二者之间存在单调递减关系,但单个国家第1期污染排放量与任意一个国家第2期的核配量之间的关系则不明朗;在各期污染存量方面,与无国际环境协议的情景相比,有国际环境协议情景下,第1期的污染存量变多还是变少不明确,但是最终的污染存量必将减少.Considering a two period dynamic game model of transboundary stock pollution and assuming that countries anticipate that an international environmental agreement,IEA,will enter into force in the future(i.e.,in period 2),this paper explored what will be the impact of the future IEA on each country’s emissions and the total stock pollution in each period.This paper draws two conclusions.Firstly,in term of the impact of the future IEA on each country’s emissions in each period,it can only draw a clear conclusion that there is a monotone decreasing relationship between the total amount of pollution emitted by all countries in period 1 and the quality of initial emission rights possessed by any country when supposing that the IEA is anticipated to implement in period 2.However,it is the stock pollution that influences the welfare of each country.In this regard,this paper reveals that,supposing that an IEA is anticipated to implement in period 2,the impact of an IEA on the stock pollution in period 1 is ambiguous,however,the stock pollution in period 2 will be reduced.

关 键 词：国际环境协议 未来协议 绿色悖论 跨界污染 动态博弈 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学]