信息不对称下闭环供应链定价及协调契约  

Pricing and coordination of the closed-loop supply chain under asymmetrical information

作　　者：王竟竟 许民利[1] 邓亚玲 Wang Jingjing;Xu Minli;Deng Yaling(School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China;School of Business Administration,Hunan University of Finance and Economics,Changsha 410000,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083 [2]湖南财政经济学院工商管理学院,湖南长沙410000

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2022年第5期617-631,共15页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BGL099).

摘　　要：在零售商风险规避信息不对称的闭环供应链中,研究了风险规避信息对闭环供应链定价和绩效的影响,探讨了实现信息共享和协调闭环供应链的契约.首先,构建了集中决策模型,对称信息下和不对称信息下的分散决策模型.其次,利用数学优化和逆向递推法对模型求解.最后,设计了不同信息结构下的协调契约.研究结果表明,风险规避的决策者会采取降低零售价格和增加回收价格的保守决策.零售商有动机隐瞒自身高风险规避水平,其隐瞒风险规避信息对制造商总是不利的.“收益共享+成本分担+转移支付”的组合契约能使零售商暴露真实的风险规避信息,同时使闭环供应链达到协调.In the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)with asymmetrical retailer risk-aversion information,this paper studied the effect of risk-aversion information on the pricing and performance,and explored the contract for information sharing and coordinating of the CLSC.Firstly,a centralized decision model,decentralized decision models with symmetrical and asymmetrical risk aversion information are established.Then,the mathematical optimization and backward induction method are used to solve those models.Finally,coordination contracts under different information structure are designed.The results show that decision makers of risk aversion will take a conservative decision of reducing the selling price and increasing the recycling price.The retailers may tend to conceal their high level of risk aversion.However,this concealment of information is always disadvantageous for the manufacturer.Therefore,the“revenue sharing+cost sharing+payment transformation”contract developed can expose the retailer’s true risk aversion level and coordinate the CLSC.

关 键 词：信息不对称 风险规避 协调契约 闭环供应链 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]