基于知识产权契约的企业研发团队创新激励研究  

Research on the Incentive for the Innovation of R&D Team in Enterprise Based on the Intellectual Property Contract

作　　者：李颖辉 宋鹏 李宝虹[3] LI Yinghui;SONG Peng;LI Baohong(Henan Diesel Engine Industry Co.,Ltd.,Luoyang 471039,China;School of Finance and Economics,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China;School of Management,Harbin Normal University,Harbin 150001,China)

机构地区：[1]河南柴油机重工有限责任公司,河南洛阳471039 [2]江苏大学财经学院,江苏镇江212013 [3]哈尔滨师范大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《技术与创新管理》2022年第6期676-688,共13页Technology and Innovation Management

基　　金：黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目(20JYB030)。

摘　　要：企业研发团队作为国家创新体系的重要组成部分,是实施创新驱动战略的重要力量。在创新绩效和创新激励的双重目标下,为优化企业研发团队创新激励决策,建立了信息不对称条件下的知识产权契约激励委托代理决策模型,利用最优知识产权契约激励企业研发团队创新行为。通过模型求解及算例仿真分析发现:知识产权契约的激励系数与研发团队努力程度呈正相关关系;管理层提供知识产权激励契约的最优激励系数受研发团队风险规避特性影响;知识产权契约的最优激励系数同技术创新活动中研发绩效和转化绩效的不确定性呈负相关关系。最优知识产权契约能够最大化企业技术创新绩效和研发团队利益;研发团队风险规避性、研究开发成功率及技术创新产出不确定性影响最优知识产权契约决策;在互补性技术创新任务中,管理层利用知识产权契约对技术创新活动的控制更加有效,委托代理效率更高。The enterprise R&D team,as an important part of national innovation system,is an important force to implement innovation driven strategy.Under the dual objectives of innovation performance and innovation incentive,in order to optimize the innovation incentive decision-making of enterprise R&D teams,the principal-agent motivate decision-making model of intellectual property contract under the condition of information asymmetry is established,and the innovative behavior of enterprise R&D team was stimulated by the optimal intellectual property contract.by solving the model and simulation analysis of numerical examples,this study finds that the incentive coefficient of intellectual property contract is positively correlated with the effort of the R&D team.The optimal incentive coefficient of intellectual property incentive contract provided by the management is affected by the risk aversion characteristics of the R&D team.The optimal incentive coefficient of intellectual property contract is negatively correlated with the uncertainty of R&D performance and transformation performance in technological innovation activities.Main conclusions:the optimal intellectual property contract can maximize the performance of technological innovation and the interests of R&D team.The risk aversion of R&D team,the success rate of R&D and the uncertainty of technological innovation output affect the optimal decision of intellectual property contract.In the complementary technological innovation task,the management uses the intellectual property contract to control the technological innovation activities more effectively,and entrusts the agent more efficient.

关 键 词：知识产权契约 研发团队 创新 激励决策 委托代理 

分 类 号：F272.4[经济管理—企业管理]