并购业绩承诺能否保护中小投资者利益——基于未达标业绩承诺的研究  

Can M&A Performance Commitment Protect the Interests of Minority Investors: A Study Based on Non-standard Performance Commitment

作　　者：周绍妮[1] 周之恬 王中超 ZHOU Shaoni;ZHOU Zhitian;WANG Zhongchao(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China;School of Economics and Management,Beijing Forestry University,Beijing 100083,China)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [2]北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《北京工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第6期153-170,共18页Journal of Beijing University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072009)。

摘　　要：业绩承诺被越来越广泛地应用于并购重组实践中,中小投资者作为资本市场的重要参与者,其利益保护问题逐渐凸显。以首次公告日在2008—2019年包含业绩承诺的并购事件为样本,实证研究发现:未达标业绩承诺存在显著的掏空效应,会严重损害中小投资者的利益,从而支持代理观假说。进一步检验了不同企业特征、并购特征和业绩承诺特征下业绩承诺掏空效应的异质性;盈余管理操纵是上市公司利用业绩承诺实行掏空行为的重要手段;外部审计和内部监管则是治理业绩承诺掏空效应的有效工具。从中小投资者保护角度丰富了并购业绩承诺有效性的研究,对于中小投资者理性判别业绩承诺和监管部门合理制定规则从而治理机会主义动机下的业绩承诺掏空行为均有现实意义。Performance commitment has been more and more widely used in mergers and acquisitions(M&A). As important participants in the capital market, the protection of the minority investors′ interests has become increasingly prominent. This paper takes the M&A events including performance commitments from 2008 to 2019, finding out that there is a significant tunneling effect in the failed performance commitments, which will seriously damage the interests of minority investors, thus supporting the agency view. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of performance commitment tunneling effect under different enterprises, M&A and performance commitment characteristics is tested;earnings management manipulation is important tools for listed companies to implement tunneling behavior by using performance commitment;external audit and internal supervision are effective tools to governance the tunneling effect. This paper enriches the research on the effectiveness of M&A performance commitment from the perspective of minority investors, provides practical significance for minority investors to judge performance commitment rationally, for regulators to formulate rules reasonably, and for administrations to simultaneously control the tunneling of performance commitment under opportunism motivation.

关 键 词：业绩承诺 信息不对称 第二类代理问题 掏空效应 中小投资者保护 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]