新公司治理  

The New Corporate Governance

作　　者：  李光武(译) Oliver Hart;Luigi Zingales;LI Guang-wu(Department of Economics,Harvard University,Massachusetts;Booth School of Business,University of Chicago,Chicago;School of Economics,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)

机构地区：[1]哈佛大学经济学系,马萨诸塞州 [2]芝加哥大学商学院,芝加哥市 [3]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872

出　　处：《学习与探索》2022年第11期117-125,200,共10页Study & Exploration

摘　　要：近年来,股东对环境和社会问题的参与程度明显提高,在某些情况下,股东正在推动公司采取可能降低其市场价值的行为。而基于股东价值最大化的主流公司治理范式很难理解这种行为。我们从法理学的角度解释了为什么股东价值最大化标准在存在经济学缺点的情况下依然可以成为主流标准。为了克服这些缺点,我们提出了股东福利最大化的标准,并认为它可以更好地解释观察到的行为。最后,我们阐述了如何在实践中贯彻股东福利最大化。In the last few years,there has been a dramatic increase in shareholder engagement on environmental and social issues.In some cases,shareholders are pushing companies to take actions that may reduce market value.It is hard to understand this behavior using the dominant corporate governance paradigm based on shareholder value maximization.We explain how jurisprudence has sustained this criterion in spite of its economic weaknesses.To overcome these weaknesses we propose the criterion of shareholder welfare maximization and argue that it can better explain observed behavior.Finally,we outline how shareholder welfare maximization can be implemented in practice.

关 键 词：公司治理 股东福利最大化 股东价值最大化 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F126[经济管理—国民经济]