“个体总是已然是意识形态主体”问题何在?——重谈阿尔都塞的询唤理论  

What’s the Problem with“Individuals Are Always-Already Subjects”?——Althusser’s Theory of Interpellation Revisited

作　　者：王春明 Wang Chunming(School of Philosophy,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院,上海200433

出　　处：《复旦学报（社会科学版）》2022年第5期122-130,共9页Fudan Journal（Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“巴塔耶生存论思想研究”(项目批准号:17CZX043)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：阿尔都塞的询唤理论历来主要受到两类批评,而且两者均指向“个体总是已然是主体”这一命题。第一类批评指出,该命题包含循环论述,在逻辑上不成立;第二类批评主张,该命题表达了一种悲观的宿命论立场,在实践上不可取。基于阿尔都塞对“生成逻辑”作出的批判,以及关于询唤之多重性的阐明,本文认为上述两类批评并不有效。与此同时,本文主张,对于“主体”概念过于宽泛的界定,才是询唤理论的真正问题所在。此种宽泛性尤其有损于蕴含在询唤理论之中的关于人之自由与解放问题的独特思考。Althusser’s theory of interpellation has traditionally been subject to two types of criticism,both of which point to the proposition that“the individual is always-already a subject.”The first type of criticism states that the proposition is a circular discourse and therefore logically unacceptable.The second type of criticism asserts that the proposition expresses a pessimistic and fatalistic position,which is not desirable in practice.Based on Althusser’s critique of“generic logic”and his clarification of the multiplicity of interpellation,the paper argues that these two types of criticism are not valid.At the same time,it is suggested that the real problem with the theory of interpellation consists in its overly broad definition of“subject.”Such a broad definition,in particular,undermines the inquiry into human freedom and emancipation that is embedded in Althusser’s theory of interpellation.

关 键 词：阿尔都塞 询唤 主体 意识形态 生成 

分 类 号：B565.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]