商誉减值、股东减持与股权质押——基于商誉减值前股东行为的微观证据  

Goodwill Impairment,Shareholder Reduction and Equity Pledge——Based on the Micro Evidence of Shareholder Behavior before Goodwill Impairment

作　　者：步丹璐[1] 王多仁 BU Dan-lu;WANG Duo-ren(School of Accounting,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2022年第10期113-126,共14页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(19FGLB045);中央高校年度培育项目(JBK2202037);十九届六中全会精神专项(JBK2212002)。

摘　　要：以中国2008—2020年沪深A股上市企业为样本,探究了商誉减值与控股股东实施股份减持或股权质押的内在关系。结果表明:与国有企业相比,非国有企业发生商誉减值的可能性更高且减值程度更大;商誉减值与控股股东提前减持股份之间存在显著正相关关系,且在轻资产行业中这种关系更为明显;控股股东的股份减持与股权质押行为在商誉减值前存在显著的替代效应。本文聚焦商誉减值前控股股东的规避风险行为,丰富了控股股东应对商誉减值的策略选择模式及不同对策之间的替代效应研究,为资本市场监管与企业治理提供了新思路。Using the samples of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2012,this paper empirically investigated the internal relationship between goodwill impairment and controlling shareholders’implementation of share reduction or equity pledge.This paper found that,compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises had a higher probability of goodwill impairment and a greater degree of impairment.Meanwhile,there was a significant positive correlation between goodwill impairment and the controlling shareholder’s early reduction of shares,which was more significant in asset-light industry.Besides,controlling shareholder’s share reduction and equity pledge had a significant substitution effect before goodwill impairment.The paper focused on the risk-aversion behavior of controlling shareholders before goodwill impairment,and enriched the strategy choices of controlling shareholders to deal with goodwill impairment and the research on the substitution effect between different countermeasures,which provided new ideas for capital market supervision and corporate governance.

关 键 词：商誉减值 股东减持 股权质押 风险规避 企业治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]