交错董事会、独董任期与大股东利益侵占  

Staggered Boards,Tenure of Independent Directors and Entrenchments of Large Shareholders

作　　者：张浩 黄俊凯 ZHANG Hao;HUANG Jun-kai(College of Business Administration,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing,100070,China;College of Management and Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing,Jiangsu,210093,China)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院,北京2100070 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《经济管理》2022年第10期171-189,共19页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“任人唯亲的董事会文化与独立董事更迭的逆淘汰”(71472177)。

摘　　要：限制董事改选条款虽然并不会形成严格任期交错的董事会,但通过对董事改选施加一定的限制条件,在客观上具有延长董事任期、维护董事会稳定性的交错董事会功能“雏形”。运用2007-2019年沪深A股上市公司的数据,本文从大小股东之间代理冲突的视角研究了交错董事会的公司治理效果,并从独立董事任期结构的角度揭示了背后的作用机制。研究发现,交错董事会的设置使得上市公司独立董事进入第二个任期的可能性更大,而处于第二个任期阶段的独立董事因摆脱了“独董逆淘汰”现象的限制而更加敢于通过对董事会议案说“不”等方式监督大股东,即交错董事会条款下所形成的独立董事结构能够更加有效地发挥其应有的监督职能,降低大股东对中小股东的利益侵占。当大股东掏空能力更强和上市公司的股权制衡度更低时,交错董事会的监督功能表现得更加明显。本文的相关结论为中国资本市场引入正式的交错董事会制度提供了借鉴和初步的证据支持。In China,independent directors are faced with a unique environment for performing their duties,which is not only reflected in the requirement of the CSRC that independent directors can only serve two consecutive terms,but also reflected in the expectation of the capital market for independent directors to supervise major shareholders.The characteristics of the tenure structure of independent directors under the special institutional background also affect the exertion of independent directors'supervisory functions.The setting of staggered board clauses of listed companies creates a research situation for this paper to analyze the supervision function of independent directors.By imposing certain restrictions on the reelection of directors,including independent directors,staggered board clauses affect the tenure structure of independent directors of listed companies,and thus affect the supervision function of independent directors.Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019,this paper studies the corporate governance effect of staggered boards of directors from the perspective of agency conflict between shareholders,and reveals the underlying mechanism from the perspective of the tenure structure of independent directors.The study found that the establishment of staggered boards of directors makes it more likely that independent directors of listed companies will enter the second term of office.Independent directors at the second term stage are more daring to supervise major shareholders by saying"no"to the board of directors'proposals because they have got rid of the restriction of"anti elimination of independent directors".That is,the structure of independent directors formed under the staggered board of directors can more effectively play supervision functions,and reduce the encroachment of large shareholders on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.When the tunneling ability of large shareholders is stronger and the equity balance of listed companies is lower,the supervision func

关 键 词：交错董事会 独立董事 任期结构 大股东利益侵占 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272[经济管理—国民经济]