基于流程创新的供应链激励合同研究  

Research on Supply Chain Incentive Contracts Based on Process Innovation

作　　者：张盼 江韶波 ZHANG Pan;JIANG Shao-bo(Management School,Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China;School of Economics and Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China)

机构地区：[1]海南大学管理学院,海南海口570228 [2]南昌大学经济管理学院,江南南昌330031

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2022年第11期161-166,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71961019,71961008)。

摘　　要：针对由一个零售商两个制造商组成的竞争供应链,建立了零售商处于领导地位的Stackelberg博弈模型。分析了收益分享合同和成本分担合同下流程创新效率和竞争强度对流程创新水平和供应链成员利润的影响,并探讨了最优激励合同类型。研究发现,流程创新效率的降低会使得制造商流程创新水平和供应链成员利润降低;竞争强度的增大会使得制造商流程创新水平和供应链成员利润增加。此外,在流程创新效率较高和竞争强度较低时零售商提供收益分享合同有利,在流程创新效率较低和竞争强度较高时零售商提供成本分担合同有利。For a competitive supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer,a Stackelberg game model with the retailer as a leader is established.The impact of process innovation efficiency and competitive intensity on process innovation level and supply chain members’profit under revenue sharing contract and cost sharing contract are analyzed.It shows that the increase of process innovation efficiency will reduce the manufacturer’s process innovation level and supply chain members’profit,and the increase of competitive intensity will increase the manufacturers’process innovation level and supply chain members’profit.In addition,it is advantageous for the retailer to provide revenue-sharing contracts when competitive intensity and process innovation efficiency are low,and it is advantageous for the retailer to provide cost-sharing contracts when competitive intensity and process innovation efficiency are high.

关 键 词：供应链 流程创新 收益分享合同 成本分担合同 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]