情感不是本体——情感儒学之本体论探析  

Emotion is not the Noumenon:A Study on the Ontology of Meng Peiyuan’s Emotion-oriented Confucianism

作　　者：李海超 LI Hai-chao

机构地区：[1]南京大学马克思主义学院,江苏南京210023 [2]南京大学中国传统文化研究中心,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《周易研究》2022年第4期14-23,共10页Studies of Zhouyi

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目:“先秦儒家伦理的情感逻辑研究”(19ZXB115)。

摘　　要：蒙培元的情感儒学具有独特的本体论建构:本体不是绝对无限性的实体,而是一种潜存的可能性;它以主观心灵境界为存在方式,以情感理性为实质内容;本体的内容并不先天地存有,而是要通过“真情实感”来创发并在情感修养的过程中实现。情感儒学降格并消解了宋明理学本体观念的绝对无限性,在本体之外创造性地发展出了一种情感本源论,这对当代儒学反思和超越传统本体论的理论形态具有重要的意义。情感儒学的情感本源论和本体论也存在一定的局限,黄玉顺的生活儒学对此作了很大的修正和发展,但仍留有讨论和开拓的空间。There is a unique construction of ontology in Meng Peiyuan’s emotion-oriented Confucianism: the conceptual body is not an absolutely infinite entity but a latent possibility;it takes the subjective spiritual realm as its way of existence and takes emotional reason as its substantial content;the content of the conceptual body does not exist innately but must be created through “true emotion and real feelings” and is realized in the process of emotion cultivation. Emotion-oriented Confucianism degraded and eliminated the absolute infinity of the noumenon from Song-Ming(960-1644) Neo-Confucianism, and creatively developed a kind of theory treating emotion outside of the noumenon as the origin, which is of great significance for contemporary Confucianism to reflect on and surpass the theoretical form of traditional Confucian ontology. This theory and ontology of emotion-oriented Confucianism can also contain certain limitations. Huang Yushun’s life-oriented Confucianism has made great revisions and developments to them, but there is also room for further discussion and development.

关 键 词：蒙培元 情感儒学 情本源论 情本体论 

分 类 号：B262[哲学宗教—中国哲学]