基于多任务委托代理模型的公立医院医生薪酬激励机制研究  

Research on the Compensation Incentive Mechanism of Doctors in Public Hospitals Based on the Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

作　　者：周桐如 王俏荔 ZHOU Tong-ru;WANG Qiao-li(School of Public Health and Management,Ningxia Medical University,Yinchuan,750004,China;不详)

机构地区：[1]宁夏医科大学公共卫生与管理学院,银川750004

出　　处：《中国卫生经济》2022年第10期21-23,39,共4页Chinese Health Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71964028)。

摘　　要：目的:研究公立医院医生两种行为下最优努力水平和最优激励程度的影响因素,为进一步完善改进公立医院激励机制提出有效性建议。方法:运用委托代理数学模型进行研究。结果:医生的努力水平与医生努力成本呈负相关,与医生的激励系数呈正相关,医生会更倾向把努力放在激励系数较高的任务上;医生的最优激励系数与医生给政府带来的收益、医生的努力成本呈正相关,与行为的可监督性呈正相关,与医生的风险规避度呈负相关。结论:政府要加强对公立医院的监管,要完善公立医院的激励机制,加大对医生社会性行为的重视程度。Objective:It studies the influencing factors of optimal effort level and optimal incentive degree under the two behaviors of doctors in public hospitals,and puts forward effective suggestions for further improving and improving the incentive mechanism of public hospitals-Methods:Principal-agent mathematical model.Results:The doctor’s effort level is negatively correlated with the doctor’s effort cost,and positively correlated with the doctor’s incentive coefficient.Doctors are more inclined to put their efforts on tasks with higher incentive coefficients.There is a positive correlation between the benefits and the effort cost of doctors,a positive correlation with the monitorability of behavior,and a negative correlation with the risk aversion of doctors.Conclusion:To improve the incentive mechanism of public hospitals,the key is to improve and strengthen the incentive mechanism of public hospitals,increase the emphasis on the social behavior of doctors,and strengthen the government’s supervision of public hospitals.

关 键 词：公立医院 医生 激励机制 多任务委托代理 

分 类 号：R1-9[医药卫生—公共卫生与预防医学] R197