董事长-CEO校友关系与公司股价崩盘风险——基于管理谋私与信息披露的双重视角  

Chairman-CEO Alumni Relation and Stock Price Crash Risk:Based on the Dual Perspectives of Management Self-interests and Information Disclosure

作　　者：严若森[1] 陈娟[1] YAN RuoSen;CHEN Juan(Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《财贸研究》2022年第11期97-110,共14页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国营商环境、总经理自主权与企业技术创新:制度基础观与高层梯队理论整合视角下的多层次研究”(72072137);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“中国家族企业的创始人政治关联、社会情感财富与控制权代际锁定研究”(18YJA630126)。

摘　　要：基于管理谋私与信息披露的双重视角,以2014—2018年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,利用固定效应模型实证研究董事长-CEO校友关系这一非正式制度对公司股价崩盘风险的影响,并考察了董事会监督、会计稳健性和媒体报道对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现:董事长-CEO校友关系会加剧公司股价崩盘风险,表明董事长-CEO校友关系在公司的经营管理和信息披露决策中起到了“裙带效应”的作用;当公司董事会监督较弱、会计稳健性较低、媒体报道较多时,董事长-CEO校友关系对公司股价崩盘风险的“裙带效应”更显著。进一步研究表明,当公司董事长和CEO均毕业于高水平院校或所处地区市场化程度较高时,董事长-CEO校友关系对公司股价崩盘风险的加剧作用更显著。Based on the dual perspectives of management self-interests and information disclosure,taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2014 to 2018 as samples,by using fixed-effect model,this paper empirically studies the impact of the informal chairman-CEO alumni relation on the stock price crash risk,and examines moderating effects of the board monitoring,accounting conservatism and media coverage on relationship between the two.The results show that:the chairman-CEO alumni relation aggravates the company’s stock price crash risk,indicating that it plays a “nepotism effect” in the company’s management and information disclosure.When a company’s board monitoring is weaker,accounting conservatism is lower,and media coverage is more,the “nepotism effect” of the chairman-CEO alumni relation on the stock price crash risk is more significant.Further research shows that when both the chairman and the CEO graduate from high-level institutions or the company’s region is more market-oriented,the chairman-CEO alumni relation plays a more significant role in exacerbating the stock price crash risk.

关 键 词：董事长-CEO校友关系 股价崩盘风险 董事会监督 会计稳健性 媒体报道 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]