机构投资者持股、产品市场竞争与上市公司违规治理  

Institutional Investors Shareholding,Market Competition of Products and Violation Governance of Listed Companies

作　　者：孙维章[1] 郭珊珊 佟成生[2] 薛智中 SUN Weizhang;GUO Shanshan;TONG Chengsheng;XUE Zhizhong(School of Accounting,Shandong Technology and Business University,Yantai 264005,China;Shanghai National Accounting Institute,Shanghai 201702,China)

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院会计学院,山东烟台264005 [2]上海国家会计学院,上海201702

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2022年第6期71-79,共9页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(20CGL014);山东省自然科学基金青年项目(ZR2020QG021)。

摘　　要：以2007—2020年的A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证检验机构投资者持股对上市公司违规的影响。研究发现:机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司违规可能性越低,且违规频率越少;机构投资者持股与产品市场竞争存在互补效应,产品市场竞争强化了机构投资者持股对上市公司的违规倾向与违规频率的治理效应。研究结论为完善公司治理和解决上市公司违规问题提供了借鉴。Taking A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as research samples,this paper empirically examines the impact of institutional investors shareholding on violations of listed companies.The results show that the higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors,the lower the possibility and frequency of violations of listed companies;There are complementary effects between institutional investors shareholding and the market competition of products,which strengthens the governance effect of institutional investors shareholding on violation tendency and violation frequency of listed companies.The conclusions provide reference for improving corporate governance and solving the violation problem of listed companies violation.

关 键 词：机构投资者持股 违规倾向 违规频率 产品市场竞争 公司治理 社会责任 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理] F276.6[经济管理—国民经济]